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DEBT, DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA
Daniel D. Bradlow*
INTRODUCTION

The debt crises of the 1980s have demonstrated that financial institutions are able to exert considerable influence over the social and economic policies of developing countries in financial distress. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank increased
their influence over these countries by expanding the scope of the conditions attached to their financial support to include a broad range of
economic and development issues.' Other official creditors have
linked debt relief to the adoption of acceptable development policies. 2
Commercial bank creditors have used their leverage to force sovereign
debtors to assume most of the costs associated with renegotiating their
debt and, where applicable, to assume responsibility for private sector
3
debt.
While this situation is clearly a troubling challenge to the soverAssistant Professor, Washington College of Law, American University. B.A., University
of Witwatersrand, South Africa (1977); J.D., Northeastern University (1982); LL.M. Georgetown University Law Center (1985); member of the District of Columbia & New York bars.
Work on this paper was supported by a Summer Research Grant from the Washington College
of Law. The author wishes to thank Marcelo de Laurentis and Joan Kerrigan for their research
assistance. The author is grateful for the comments of Professors Robert Goldman, Claudio
Grossman, Tom Farer, and Dr. Jo Marie Griesgraber.
1. There is extensive literature on this subject. For a discussion of the influence of these
organizations in developing countries both prior to 1980 and thereafter, see generally R. FEINBERG, BETWEEN Two WORLDS: THE WORLD BANK'S NEXT DECADE (Overseas Development
Council Policy Perspectives No. 7, 1986); C. GwIN & R. FEINBERG, THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD (1989); C. PAYER, THE DEBT TRAP: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE THIRD WORLD (1976); E. HUTCHFUL, THE IMF
AND GHANA: THE CONFIDENTIAL RECORD (1987); R. BROAD, UNEQUAL ALLIANCE: THE
WORLD BANK, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE PHILIPPINES (1988); I.M.F.
CONDITIONALITY (J. Williamson ed. 1983).
2. The Paris Club, the forum in which official debt is rescheduled, requires debtors to have an
IMF approved adjustment program as a precondition to debt relief. See A. REIFFEL, THE ROLE
OF THE PARIS CLUB IN MANAGING DEBT PROBLEMS (Essays in International Finance No. 161,
1985).
3. See generally H. GREEN, THIRD WORLD DEBT RENEGOTIATION 1980-86 AND AFTER
(Institute of Departmental Studies, University of Sussex, Discussion Paper 223, 1986); UNITED
NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA CARIBBEAN, TRANSNATIONAL BANK

BEHAVIOUR AND THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS (1989); Mudge, Restructuring Private and
Public Sector Debt: Country Debt Structure, 20 INT'L. LAW. 847 (1986); INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, LATIN AMERICA SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT: LEGAL AND REGU-

LATORY ASPECTS (R. Reisner, E. Cardenas, & A. Mendes eds. 1990).
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eignty and freedom of action of the debtor countries, it does have some
positive developmental consequences. Multilateral development organizations have recognized the need for greater participation by project
beneficiaries in the design and implementation of sustainable development strategies. 4 A few bilateral aid agencies have also acknowledged
that sustainable development strategies must pay due regard to the
human rights of a country's citizens. 5 Even commercial banks have
begun to contribute some of their debt to finance development
6
projects.
These lessons have not been lost on non-governmental human
rights organizations, some of whom have argued that both official and
commercial creditors should use their leverage to compel debtor governments that are particularly egregious violators of human rights to
change their policies. The use of financial pressure for human rights
purposes has been advocated against such countries as South Africa,
Zaire, the Philippines, Turkey, Chile, Poland, Yugoslavia, Panama,
7
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Israel.
It is easy to understand the attraction of using financial sanctions
to achieve human rights gains in debtor countries. External creditors
are already applying financial pressure to target countries and these
creditors can be subjected to public pressure in their home countries.
Official creditors can be held politically accountable for their actions
and are therefore sensitive to charges that they provide financial support to governments which violate the human rights of their citizens.
4. See generally WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990 (1990); INTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA:

1990 REPORT (1990).
5. Dutch, Norwegian and Canadian aid agencies have begun to build human rights and environmental criteria into their aid programs. See K. TOMASEVSKI, DEVELOPMENT AID AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 50-56 (1989). See also Donor Countries Linking Aid to Human Rights, The
Reuter Library Report, Dec. 5, 1990 (BC Cycle). On the linkage between development and
human rights, see, for example, Stewart, Basic Needs Strategies, Human Rights, and the Right to
Development, I1 HUM. RTS. Q. 347 (1989). The United States uses denial of aid to combat
extreme human rights abuses. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) states that the United States may not provide any assistance to "any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights." 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1990).
6. See Burton, Debt for Development: A New Opportunity for Nonprofits, Commercial Banks,
and Developing States, 31 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 233 (1990); Gibson & Curtis, A Debt for Nature
Blueprint, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 331 (1990); Comment, The Debt-for-Nature Swap: A
Long Term Investment for the Economic Stability of Less Developed Countries, 24 INT'L. LAW.
1071 (1990).
7. See J. CAVANAGH, F. CHERU, C. COLLINS, C. DUNCAN & D. NTUBE, FROM DEBT TO

DEVELOPMENT (1985) (suggesting that renegotiation of South African, Zairian, and Filippino
debt be linked to human rights improvements); G. HUFBAUER, J. SCHOTr, & K. ELLIOT, ECoNOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY (2d ed. 1990). On sanctions generally, see B. CARTER,
HAPHAZARD U.S.

TRADE (1990).

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:

LEGAL REGIME (1988);

IMPROVING

THE
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Commercial creditors are vulnerable to pressure from shareholders
and consumer groups. While this pressure may not stop commercial
banks from rescheduling outstanding debts, banks are unlikely to provide new credits to countries that are the targets of concerted public
campaigns.
Financial sanctions, however, are a blunt policy instrument. They
cannot easily be structured to affect only those elements of the target
society that are the perpetrators of the human rights violations. A
determined government and its allies can redirect financial resources
so that the sanctions disproportionately affect the poor and powerless
sections of the target society.8 Thus, the socioeconomic consequences
of even a successful sanctions campaign may be to so weaken the sanctions' intended beneficiaries that they are unable to translate their victory into sustainable political and socioeconomic advances.
This suggests that if financial sanctions are to be used for human
rights purposes, they must be viewed as part of an overall development
assistance strategy that is designed to help improve the social, economic, and political conditions in which the poorest and weakest elements of the target society live. 9 The possibility of developing such a
strategy depends both on coordinating the punitive and developmental
aspects of the sanctions and on establishing a means for identifying
appropriate development activities and development financing mechanisms. In this context, "appropriate development" means development activities that are consistent with international human rights
standards, that are environmentally, financially, and managerially sustainable, and that involve the beneficiaries in the design, implementation, and management of the development activity. 10
This paper, through a case study of financial sanctions against
South Africa, demonstrates that it is possible to design a developmentoriented financial sanctions strategy against any country that violates
the human rights of its citizens and in which government regulations,
including exchange controls, result in foreign-owned financial assets
8. In most debtor countries the poor have suffered most from the debt crisis and attempts to
deal with it. This has been reflected in infant mortality rates, nutrition standards, minimum
wages, employment rates, education, and income distribution. See I ADJUSTMENT WITH A
HUMAN FACE (G. Cornia, R. Jolly, & F. Stewart eds. 1987); INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK, supra note 4, at 25-27.
9. In principle this can be achieved by linking sanctions to an aid program once the sanctions
have produced the desired policy change in the target country. However, this strategy will not
minimize suffering during the period in which sanctions are in force, nor will it help the future
beneficiaries benefit from any development opportunities that arise while the sanctions are in
force.
10. For a detailed discussion of the elements of this definition, see infra notes 129-51 and
accompanying text.
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being trapped in the target country. This strategy will both deprive
the perpetrators of the human rights violations of new funds and will
help redirect the blocked funds into activities that are designed to promote the political and socioeconomic development of the victims of
the human rights abuses. The means for identifying appropriate development activities used in this strategy can also be used to test the
human rights and developmental appropriateness of development
projects that are not part of a sanctions campaign.
The South African case is particularly interesting because, based
on recent developments in South Africa, " it appears to be an example
of a successful financial sanctions strategy. In fact, the strategy of using South Africa's debt problems to promote change in the country
cannot be considered a successful human rights campaign. Even
though the South African Government (SAG) has been weakened. by
financial pressure, it has been able to renegotiate the country's debt
without having any human rights or development conditions incorporated into its renegotiated financial arrangements.' 2 In addition, the
victims of apartheid have borne the brunt of the debt burden without
being able to take advantage of the development financing opportunities created by the country's debt situation. The result is that, while
the financial pressure on the SAG has been alleviated, the social and
economic situation of the majority of South Africans has

deteriorated. 13
After a brief description of the country's political economy, this
paper will analyze the evolution of the South African debt crisis and
11. Since June 1989, the South African Government has lifted the ban on the African National Congress (ANC) and other political organizations, released Nelson Mandela and many but
not all political prisoners, allowed the return of some exiles, and taken the first steps towards
negotiating a new democratic constitution for South Africa with the ANC. The government has
also acknowledged that the country faces serious socioeconomic problems that cannot be solved
as long as the apartheid system remains in place, and that the country is suffering from its relative exclusion from the international economy and international capital markets. See After
Apartheid, A Survey of South Africa, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 1991.

In February 1991, the

South African Government announced that it would repeal the statutory foundations of
apartheid: the Group Areas Act, the Land Acts, and the Population Registration Act. See,
Wren, South Africa Moves to Scrap Apartheid, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1991, at 1, col. I. The South

African Parliament repealed the Group Areas and 1913 and 1936 Land Acts on June 5, 1991, see
Wren, New York Times, June 6, 1991, at A3, col. 4, and the Population Registration Act on
June 17, 1991. See Wren, South Africa Scraps Law Defining People by Race, N.Y. Times, June
18, 1991, at Al, col. 3.

12. The terms of the three Interim Arrangements negotiated between the SAG and the country's creditors are discussed infra notes 68-114 and accompanying text. For information on the
First Interim Arrangement, see infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text; on the Second Interim
Arrangement, see infra notes 74-91 and accompanying text; on the Third Interim Arrangement,
see infra note 114 and accompanying text.

13. See discussion of South Africa's political economy infra notes 14-32 and accompanying
text.
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financial sanctions against South Africa. Then the paper will describe
an alternate sanctions strategy that, if implemented; would have both
maintained financial pressure on the SAG and provided financial
assistance to qualifying development projects in the country. This alternate strategy includes both criteria for identifying such projects and
a proposal for a development financing mechanism. It is important to
note that even though sanctions against South Africa are being lifted,
creditors still have financial assets trapped in South Africa that can be
used to fund the developmental aspects of this strategy.
SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY

The South African economy, like that of many developing countries, is characterized by substantial government participation in the
economy and heavy regulation of private economic activity.' 4 The result in South Africa is an economy which creates wealth and economic
power for a small elite, and poverty for the majority.' 5 Governmental
control over the economy also distorts development by limiting the
opportunities and the incentives for non-governmental development
initiatives. 16

A 1986 U.S. Department of Commerce report described South Africa as "a chronic debtor, import-starved, ridden with ethnic divisions,
a repressive regime.., whose only leverage is its ability to manipulate
foreign governments and attract international attention."' 7 The report
adds that even before sanctions, South Africa was a difficult place for
14. See, e.g., H. DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1990) (discussing the inhibition of non-governmental initiatives in Peru); S. GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT (1988) (discussing the
socioeconomic effect of development policies in Morocco, Zaire, and Latin America.) On South
Africa's political economy, see generally S. LEWIS, THE ECONOMICS OF APARTHEID (1990); A.
STADLER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA (1987); THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF SOUTH AFRICA (N. Natrass & E. Ardington eds. 1990); J.SAUL AND S.GELB,
THE CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA: CLASS DEFENSE, CLASS REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1986); J. Knight,
A ComparativeAnalysis of South Africa as a Semi-Industrialized Developing Country, 26 J.MOD.
AFR.STUDIES 473 (1988).
15. In 1983, white South Africans had an annual disposable income per capita of R6,242,
urban Africans had an income of RI,366, and rural Africans' income was R388. In 1980, it was
estimated that about 50% of South Africans lived below subsistence levels. See F. WILSON & M.
RAMPHELE, UPROOTING POVERTY: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHALLENGE 17-20 (Report for the
Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in South Africa, 1989); SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1987/88 (1988). Tito
Mboweni, head of the African National Congress' economic policy department, estimates 5% of
South Africa's population owns more than 88% of the personal wealth. Mboweni, ANC Callsfor
Business Partnership,EUROMONEY, Feb. 1991, at 69.
16. See sources cited supra note 14. The term "non-governmental" refers to both private
commercial activities and all other development activities that are not initiated and controlled by
the government and its instrumentalities.
17. Parks, S. Africa Irked as U.S. Sees Troubled Business Climate, Los Angeles Times, Oct.
24, 1986, at 13, col. 4, 16, col. 2.
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U.S. companies to do business because of excessive government con-

trol of the economy and regulation of business activity.' 8
The South African development strategy, which is based on the

government's apartheid ideology, has led to an irrational and inequitable allocation of resources.' 9 The country's white population has a
surplus of 37,000 houses while the black population suffers from a
growing housing shortage that in 1987 was between 700,000 and 1.4
million units and was expected to reach 2 million units in 1990.20 In
fact, the situation is so serious that there are now 7 million shanty
dwellers and seventy percent of urban blacks have inadequate access
2
to clean water and electricity. '
In the last decade over 190 white schools have been closed due to
inadequate attendance, while black students are forced to attend overcrowded "black" schools and over 1 million children are unable to
attend school at all. 22 This educational crisis has resulted in an economy that suffers from both an unemployment rate of at least thirty
percent 23 and a shortage of about 100,000 to 150,000 skilled artisans,
18. Id.
19. The South African Chamber of Business estimates the cost of remedying the racial inequities caused by apartheid to be R52 billion and a leading South African economist has estimated
the costs to be between R20 billion and R30 billion per year over the next decade. Chester, The
Soaring Cost of Killing Apartheid, The Star, Feb. 20, 1991, at 13; Apartheid Barometer, The
Weekly Mail (Johannesburg, South Africa), Feb. 15-21, 1991, at 4. See also Savage, The Cost of
Apartheid, 9 THIRD WORLD Q. 601 (1987). Wilson & Ramphele, commenting on the policies of
the South African government, state that "these policies of separate development, anti-urbanization, forced removals, Bantu education, the crushing of organizations, and in more recent years,
destabilization have been directly responsible for increased poverty amongst millions of people.
Indeed it is precisely this dimension of premeditation or deliberate policy in impoverishing people that makes poverty in South Africa different from that in so many other parts of the world."
F. WILSON & M. RAMPEHELE, supra note 15, at 230.
20. See SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, supra note 13, at 198; Wren,

Bulldozers Visit a Township, Followed by Misery, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1990, at A4, col. 2; Cowell, For South African Squatters, Life Just Gets Harder, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1990, at A2, col. 1.
21. Sparks, South African Population Shift Seen Fostering Urban Squalor, Washington Post,
July 23, 1990, at AI (discussing shanty dwellers); F. WILSON & M. RAMPHELE, supra note 15, at

144-51 (discussing access to water and electricity).
22. P. Molefe, 'Apartheid Education' Flounders to Another Year, The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg, South Africa), Dec. 21, 1989 - Jan. 18, 1990, at 16. In 1990 the government did begin to
address this issue by allowing white schools to admit black students, provided over 70% of white
parents agree and there are vacancies in the school. See Wren, South Africa Integrates Some
Schools, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at A3, col. 1; Kraft, Dozen of White Schools Open Doors to
Blacks, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 10, 1991, at A4, col. 1.
23. According to the South African Institute for Race Relations in 1988, some experts estimate total African unemployment to be between 5.5 and 6.1 million persons and in some rural
areas the unemployment rate is 50%.

SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR RACE RELATIONS,

supra note 15, at 293-95. It also states that the Congress of South African Trade Union claims
the unemployment rate for women is three times that for men. Id. at 295. The general unemployment rate for black workers is now estimated to be at least 40%. See Rumney, A Tiny
Flicker of Light Amid the Gloom, The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg, South Africa), Dec. 20, 1990
- Jan. 10, 1991, at 22.
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about 212,00 management personnel, and about 200,000 people with
technical skills. 24 "Black" hospitals have an occupancy rate of over
100%, while "white" hospital wards are closed for lack of demand. 25
Despite these conditions, in its fiscal year 1991 budget, the government allocated about fifty percent of its funds to the implementation of
apartheid, including multiple departments of health, education, housing, and welfare, and to the State's security apparatus. 26 The fiscal
year 1992 budget, despite a fifteen percent per annum inflation rate,
provides for a sixteen and one-tenth percent increase in spending on
education, an eight and nine-tenths percent increase in the health
27
budget, and a fifty-three percent increase in the police budget.
The inefficiency of the government's development strategy is also
demonstrated by the resources it expends to reward its supporters.
The government spends about R700 billion per annum

28

to subsidize

private firms that are willing to invest in locations that the government
selects according to the dictates of apartheid rather than considerations of economic efficiency. A recent study shows that nearly sev29
enty-four percent of the recipient firms are unprofitable.
The government continues to provide substantial financial support
to white farmers. About ninety percent of all agricultural production
is subject to government controls that affect both production and distribution. The degree of inefficiency of these policies allows the destruction of surplus agricultural products in some areas of the country,
while in other areas of the country people experience serious food
30
shortages.

24. Nel, Inevitabilities of Change, in THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY FORUM 31 (Third Conference, Aspen Institute, Apr. 12-15, 1990).
25. In the first half of the 1980s, black South Africans had an infant mortality rate (94-124
per 1000 live births) that was worse than those of such African countries as Kenya (76), Congo
(77), and Zambia (84) and on a par with that of Burundi (119), while the rate for white South
Africans (12) compared favorably with that of the United States. F. WILSON & M. RAMPHELE,
supra note 15, at 107-08. Recently the government has begun to integrate hospitals.
26. Fabricius, BarendKeeps Tight Rein on Purse Strings, The Star, Mar. 21, 1990, at 12, col.
1.
27. At A Glance, The Star, Mar. 27, 1991, at 13.
28. Between 1986 and February 1990, the Rand-United States dollar exchange rate flucuated
between R2.03 to a $1 and R2.78 to a $1. See S. AFR. RESERVE BANK Q. BULL., Mar. 1990, at
S-Si. Prior to 1982, the exchange rate fluctuated between $1.5 to RI and $1 to RI. R. BETHLEHEM, ECONOMICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY: SANCTIONS AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF SOUTH AFRICA 126 (1988).

29. The information in this paragraph is drawn from Waldmeir, Survey on South Africa:
Dumping Grounds of Apartheid, The Financial Times, June 11, 1990, at IV.
30. Gawith, Survey of South Africa: Difficulties Ahead-Agriculture, The Financial Times,
June 11, 1990, at VII.
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This brief description of South Africa's political economy 3 l demonstrates that apartheid is a developmental as well as a human rights
tragedy. In 1985, when the country's debt crisis erupted, the trade
unions, community organizations, and democratic organizations in the
country were all trying, on both a political and socioeconomic level, to
address the country's development crisis. 32 However, their efforts

were constrained by the political situation in the country and by a lack
of financial resources and technical skills.
The debt crisis, by trapping South Africa's creditors' assets in the
country, offered an opportunity for resolving the country's development and political crises. We now turn to a consideration of how the
crisis arose and was handled.
BACKGROUND ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEBT CRISIS

During the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa significantly increased
its reliance on external debt to finance economic growth. 33 This development was particularly pronounced during the first half of the 1980s.
Between 1980 and 1984, South Africa's total debt increased from
$16.9 billion (R12.66 billion, equal to twenty percent of GDP) to
$24.3 billion (R48.2 billion, equal to forty-six percent of GDP). 34 The
growth in short term debt was even more dramatic. Short term debt
as a portion of total debt increased from forty-nine percent in 1980 to
over sixty-six percent by the end of 1984. 31 Even though the dollar
value of South Africa's debt declined throughout the first half of 1985,
adverse currency fluctuations meant that in Rand terms the debt burden increased.3 6 By August 1985 the total external debt was equal to
about fifty percent of GDP and most of this debt was short term, that
31. For more detailed information, see sources cited supra note 14, and F. WILSON & M.
supra note 15.
32. F. WILSON & M. RAMPHELE, supra note 15, at 275-97. See also M. SINCLAIR, HOPE AT
LAST: A GUIDE TO GRANTMAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA (1990). For a discussion of the development of the South Africa trade union movement, see S. FRIEDMAN, BUILDING TOMORROW
TODAY: AFRICAN WORKERS IN TRADE UNIONS (1987).
33. S. LEWIS, supra note 14, at 65. In 1956 equity investments represented 75% of total
foreign investment, but by the mid-1980s debt, particularly short-term debt, was the major form
of external financing.
34. Hirsch, Sanctions, Loans and the South African Economy, in SANCTIONS AGAINST
APARTHEID 27 (M. Orkin ed. 1989).
35. Id.; Harris, South Africa's External Debt Crisis, 8 THIRD WORLD Q. 807 (1986);
Padayachee, Private International Banks, The Debt Crisis and the Apartheid State, 87 AFR. AFF.
367 (1988); Grant, The Banks Abandon South Africa, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1985, at 68. See generally G. HUFBAUER, J. SCHOTT, & K. ELLIOT, supra note 7, at 221-35.
36. By August 1985 South Africa's total external debt was $23.9 billion. J. LIND AND D.
ESPALDON, SOUTH AFRICA'S DEBT AT THE TIME OF CRISIS 1 (1986). This was equal to about
R50 billion. Hirsch, supra note 34, at 272-73.
RAMPHELE,

Summer 1991]

Lessons from South Africa

is, with a maturity of less than one year.3 7
The increase in borrowing was partly due to a substantial shift in
the direction of South African capital flows. In 1982 there had been a
net inflow of R3.2 billion per annum. In the eighteen months prior to
August 1985, there was a net outflow of R5.6 billion. 38 It is estimated
that there was a net capital loss in the first half of the 1980s of between
R20 and R30 billion.3 9 This capital flight is attributable to a number
of factors, including loss of confidence in the political leadership of the
country and in the future of the economy, and to deregulation of the
financial markets, which made it possible for South Africans to send
their capital abroad. 4°
Another significant cause of the increase in debt was the SAG's
response to the recession experienced by the country when the price of
gold began its steep descent from its 1980 peak of $800 an ounce. 4 1 By
November 1982, the recession was severe enough that the SAG was
forced to draw on the financial support of the International Monetary
42
Fund.
In 1983, in an effort to deal with rising inflation and a deteriorating
balance of payments position, the SAG deregulated the foreign exchange markets and allowed the Rand to float. It also allowed domestic interest rates to increase sharply, creating a substantial differential
between domestic and international interest rates, and implemented
measures designed to assist international traders and borrowers in
hedging their exchange risks.4 3 These actions made foreign financing
so attractive that some South African commercial banks began to borrow in the short-term interbank market to fund medium term credits
to South African public and private sector borrowers. They were
counting on the large interest rate differential between their international borrowing and domestic lending rates to cover the costs of these
risky operations.
The ease with which South African borrowers were able to obtain
funds is surprising and raises questions about the prudence of the
37. Hirsch, supra note 34, at 272-73; Padayachee, supra note 35, at 371-74.

38. Martin, The South African Credit Crisis of 1985, 4 TRANSAFRICA F. 17, 21 (1986). See
generally S. AFR. RESERVE BANK

Q.

BULL., supra note 28, at S-65.

39. See Martin, supra note 38.

40. See S. LEWIS, supra note 14, at 154.
41. For an analysis of these policies, see J. SAUL & S. GELB, supra note 14, at 22-32; Innes,
Monetarism and the South African Crisis, 3 S. AFR. REV. 290 (1986).
42. Morell, A Billion Dollars for South Africa, INT'L POL'Y REP., Apr. 1983, at 1-3.
43. The interest rate differential could be as much as 10-12%. The exchange rate hedges
involved the sale of foreign exchange for future delivery on terms that placed the risk of currency
fluctuations on the SAG. See Padayachee, supra note 35, at 365.
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banks' actions in South Africa" The heaviest borrowing activity occurred in 1983-84, after the onset of the debt crises that the banks
faced with their Latin American and Eastern European borrowers. It
also occurred at a time when the South African economy was stagnat45
ing and per capita income was falling.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand the attraction of South African borrowers to the banks. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that South Africa, unlike most countries to which
commercial banks extended credit, was, in effect, cut off from IMF
financial support and policy advice. The IMF's 1982 decision to give
financial support to South Africa had proven to be very contentious.
A number of the Fund's executive directors and staff opposed the financing, arguing inter alia that South Africa was being given unduly
46
favorable treatment.
The IMF's action led the U.S. Congress to adopt legislation instructing the U.S. Executive Director to "actively oppose" any use of
IMF funds to assist South Africa because "the practice of apartheid
results in severe constraints on labor and capital mobility and other
highly inefficient labor and capital supply rigidities which contribute
to balance of payments deficits in direct contradiction to the goals of
the International Monetary Fund."'47 The banks, South Africa, and
the IMF recognized that without U.S. support, there was no real possibility of the IMF providing financial support to South Africa.
The banks also based their decision to lend to South African borrowers on a flawed assessment of the country's ability to manage its
debt. When the SAG deregulated the foreign exchange markets, it did
not replace its previous regulatory scheme with any mechanism for
prudent management of the country's external debt. Consequently, it
had incomplete knowledge of the size or repayment schedule of the
country's debt. In fact, by late 1984, banks were beginning to express
concern about the country's ability to service its 1985-86 debt obligations. In March 1985 Citibank observed: "South Africa's external fi44. The borrowers were predominantly private corporations. The sanctions campaign made
it difficult, but not impossible, for the public sector to directly raise funds in international markets. Id. at 366. For a general description of the sanctions campaign's effect on loans to South
Africa, see J. HANLON & R. OMOND, THE SANCTIONS HANDBOOK 333-34 (1987).
45. Padayachee, supra note 35, at 365, 370. Hirsch, supra note 34, at 271.
46. South Africa was allowed to obtain most of the financing from the IMF's low-conditionality Compensatory Financing Facility at a time when most debtor countries were adopting austerity programs as a result of the IMF's stringent conditionalities. See Morrell, supra note 42, at

2.
47. 22 U.S.C. § 286aa (1988). For a general discussion of the debate over IMF support for
South Africa, see Morrell, A Victory Over Apartheid, INT'L POL'Y REP., April 1984, at 1-9.
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nances are in total chaos."' 48 It went on to state that the South African
Reserve Bank had paid "no regard whatsoever . . . to the maturity
structure of the debt." 49 Citibank concluded that "it is difficult to see
how debt refinancing on the scale required . . . can possibly be
achieved." 50
These growing financial problems were compounded by the political situation in the country and by a foreign reserve crisis caused by
the collapsing value of the Rand. In order to protect the Rand, which
had fallen in value from about eighty-eight cents to the dollar to about
forty cents, the Reserve Bank had used up most of its reserves and had
entered into a number of gold swap arrangements. The result was that
foreign reserves were declining as debt payments were falling due.51
In mid-1985 South Africa's political and financial difficulties
reached a crisis point. Its economy was experiencing the worst recession since the 1930s, and it was facing the most sustained period of
political protest in the country's history. 52 On July 20, in response to
these developments, the government imposed a state of emergency, the
first since the time of the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. Over the next
week, the market value of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange dropped
R 11billion; this was caused largely by selling by American, French,
and British investors. The French government announced restrictions
on French investments in South Africa, thereby giving official support
to the international divestment campaign, and on July 31 Chase Manhattan Bank announced that it would not extend any new credits to
South African borrowers nor would it roll over short term loans that
were to fall due in late August. This announcement was quickly followed by a similar announcement from Security Pacific Bank. It soon
53
became clear that other banks intended to take like action.
At the time, about eighty-five percent of U.S. bank exposure to
South Africa, fifty-seven percent of U.K. bank credits to South Africa,
and thirty-one percent of German credits were short term. 54 Since
there was a "bunching" of debt payments falling due in the second
48. Hirsch, supra note 34, at 273.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See sources cited supra notes 34-35.
52. See sources cited supra notes 34-35. The following discussion of the unfolding of the
South African debt crisis are based on these sources. For a chronology of the South African debt
crisis, see G. HUFBAUER, J. SCHOTT, & K. ELLIOT, supra note 7, at 221-35.
53. Chase Manhattan was not the first bank to take such action but it was the first to do so
publicly. Its actions had particular significance because of the influence that Chase Manahattan,
as a money center bank, has with other banks. G. HUFBAUER, J. SCHOTT,& K. ELLIOT, supra
note 7, at 223.
54. Hirsch, supra note 34, at 274.
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half of 1985, it was obvious that if all these banks refused to roll over
their debts as they fell due, South African borrowers would be unable
55
to meet their obligations.
The situation was exacerbated by President Botha's "Rubicon"
speech to the Party Congress in mid-August. Prior to this speech, the
government had let it be known that the President was going to announce major reforms. 5 6 President Botha stated that the country had
"crossed the Rubicon" on the road to reform, but that he would set
the pace and choose the terms. 57 He ruled out political power sharing
and blamed "barbaric communist agitators" for the social unrest in
58
the country.
The reaction to the speech was dramatic. It was followed by a
twenty percent drop in the value of the Rand and a substantial capital
outflow. By August 27, the situation was critical and the SAG was
forced to close the foreign exchange and stock markets. Before allowing the markets to reopen on September 2, the SAG announced
59
that it was:
(a) declaring a four month moratorium on the repayment of $10
billion of payments falling due on short term debt, primarily
interbank debt. Foreign government-guaranteed debts, trade
credits, Eurobonds, and IMF funds were excluded from the
moratorium; and
(b) reintroducing the two tier currency, with the financial rand
being reintroduced for the purpose of limiting outflows
55. For a detailed analysis of South Africa's debt profile at this time, see J. LIND & D.
note 36.
56. See R. BETHLEHEM, supra note 28, at 71-73. It has been suggested that a draft of the
speech was shown to senior United States and British officials before it received cabinet approval.
The cabinet subsequently insisted on major changes. Id.
57. The tone of President Botha's speech and his general understanding of the situation in
ESPALDON, supra

the country are evident from the following quote from the speech,

But let me be quite frank with you. You must know where you stand with me.... I am not
prepared to lead White South Africans and other minority groups on a road of abdication
and suicide. Destroy White South Africa and our influence, and this country will drift into
We have never given in to outside demands and we
factional strife, chaos, and poverty ....
are not going to do so. South Africa's problems will be solved by South Africans and not by
foreigners. We are not going to be deterred from doing what we think best, nor will we be

forced into doing what we don't want to do. The tragedy is that hostile pressure and agitation from abroad have acted as an encouragement to the militant revolutionaries in South

Africa to continue with their violence and intimidation. They have derived comfort and
succour from this pressure.
R. BETHLEHEM, supra note 28, at 72.
58. See G. HUFBAUER, J. SCHOTT & K. ELLIOT, supra note 7, at 223. See also Hirsch, supra

note 34, at 274; Grant, supra note 35, at 69.
59. Proclamation R 157/1985, as issued by the State President of South Africa, Gov't Gazette Sept. 1, 1985, at 9926. These measures were eventually extended until March 31, 1986. See
G.N.R 2868/1986, in Gov't Gazette Feb. 23, 1985 at 10054. The statutes are analyzed in Du

Plessis, South Africa's Foreign Debt Moratorium, 8 MOD. BUSINESSMAN'S L. 24, 28 (1986).
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through the capital account of the balance of payments. 60
The Government Proclamation specifically excludes from the
scope of the moratorium debts of the SAG and debts owed to or guaranteed by other governments. The moratorium was, therefore, limited
61
to debt owed by the South African private sector to private lenders.
This meant that at the time of the initial debt negotiations the SAG
was not legally responsible for the debt and was only seeking to establish an orderly repayment mechanism for private borrowers. 62 It also
meant that South Africa would not have to approach the Paris Club to
renegotiate its official debt. 63 Thus, South Africa could not be subjected to official creditor pressure.
The banks' response to the SAG's action was to set up a committee
64
of twenty-nine banks to represent the country's 233 bank creditors.
65
This committee negotiated with South Africa through a mediator.
The banks were aware of the political sensitivity of the South African debt negotiations. In the early stages of the crisis they appeared to
be requiring the SAG to satisfy certain political demands as a precondition to a successful debt renegotiation. The preconditions were
based on demands of the anti-apartheid movement, such as the release
of key political prisoners and the lifting of the state of emergency. 66 In
the end, a new one year debt arrangement was concluded in March
67
1986 without the SAG satisfying any of these political conditions.
THE FIRST INTERIM ARRANGEMENT

The terms of the First Interim Arrangement were that the SAG
would make available sufficient foreign exchange to repay five percent
($500 million) of the principal of the debt over the one year life of the
60. The two tier market consists of a Commercial Rand which is used for current transactions and a Financial Rand which trades at a discount to the Commercial Rand and is used only
in capital account transactions. For a detailed description of the two-tier currency market, see
The Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Limited, The FinancialRand Market, in THE MECHANICS
OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 339-48 (3d ed. 1989).

61. The crisis was a serious one for the banks because a significant amount of the debt was
interbank debt. See Harris, supra note 30, at 807. For a description of the interbank market's
important role in international finance, see M. STIGUM & R. BRANCH, MANAGING BANK ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 128-30 (1983).

62. See Du Plessis, supra note 59, at 33.
63. See A. REIFFEL, supra note 2, at 8-10.
64. See Hirsh, supra note 34, at 274.
65. This was an unusual, but not unprecedented, procedure for renegotiating debt. It had
been used to reschedule Indonesia's debt after the fall of the Sukarno government in 1966. Like
the South African case, this was a politically sensitive debt renegotiation. Farber, Renegotiating
Official Debts, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 1990, at 20-21.
66. See sources cited supra notes 34-35.

67. See Harris, supra note 35, at 803.
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arrangement and the banks would reschedule the remaining $9.5 billion over twelve months with an interest rate of one percent to one and
a quarter percent over pre-moratorium rates. 68 The banks also established a technical committee to represent them in future discussions
with the SAG. Over the life of this agreement, the SAG actually made
about $2 billion of the scheduled $3.6 billion interest and principal
payments due on South Africa's total debt, indicating that some of the
69
banks must have refinanced their credits.
Compared to the terms achieved by other debtor countries, this
first interim arrangement seems unusually harsh. It provided no new
funds, gave the South African debtors no grace period, and required
them to repay about five percent of the principal of the outstanding
debt. On the other hand, it did provide some significant benefits to a
government that, prior to this arrangement, had been unable to raise
70
money on the international markets.
The interim arrangement provided that if the banks and the original debtor did not reschedule the debt according to the agreed terms,
the original debtor would make payments equal to the local currency
equivalent of the original obligation into Special Restricted Accounts
that matured according to a schedule stipulated in the Interim Arrangement. These accounts, credited to the original creditor, were held
until maturity by the Permanent Investment Commission (PIC), a
public sector entity that invests in public sector stock. 7 1 The SAG was
therefore free to use these deposits, subject only to the PIC's statutory
authority, until the repayment obligation matured. 72 Consequently,
the arrangement enabled the SAG to utilize the assets of international
banks at a time of significant economic difficulty in South Africa and
73
at a time when it had no access to international financial markets.
Thus, overall the agreement was an attractive one for the SAG.
68. Hirsch,supra note 34, at 275. See also Harris, supra note 35, at 804. The banks were free
within these parameters to reach their own agreements with their original debtors.
69. Hirsch, supra note 34, at 275.
70. See sources cited supra notes 34-35.
71. The PIC is a non-banking financial intermediary that receives funds from public sector
entities and invests in fixed interest public sector stock. Its scope and responsibilities are set out
in Public Investment Commissioners Act, Stat. of S. Afr. No. 45 of 1984. See The Department of
Finance, The Public Investment Commissioners, in THE MECHANICS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 109, 109-16 (3d ed. 1989).

72. See Du Plessis, supra note 59, at 33. It is important to recognize that this arrangement
enabled the SAG to use budgetary resources for other purposes.
73. The funds available to the PIC from "other" sources (i.e., unattributed sources) increased
from R523 million in 1985 to R1920 million in 1986. It is reasonable to assume that a significant
portion of this increase is due to debt payments. See S. AFR. RESERVE BANK

note 28, at S-44.

Q.

BULL., supra
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THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS

By revealing the economic and financial vulnerability of the SAG,
the debt negotiations, together with popular revulsion at the SAG's
response to political developments in South Africa, resulted in an intensification of the international sanctions campaign. In 1985, the
United Nations Security Council urged all Member States to ban all
new investments and export credits to South Africa. 74 In 1986, the
Member States of the European Community agreed to prohibit certain
imports from South Africa and placed restrictions on new investments
in South Africa, but did not prohibit European banks from rescheduling their outstanding South African credits. 7 5 The Commonwealth
76
also sought to intensify its sanctions against South Africa.
Overriding a Presidential Veto, the United States Congress adopted

the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in October 1986. 77
The primary purpose of the CAAA is to help create a nonracial democracy in South Africa by using "economic, political, diplomatic,

and other effective means to achieve the removal of... the apartheid
system."'7 8 The CAAA implements this policy by barring most trade
with South Africa and prohibiting new investments and new loans to
South Africa. The definition of "loan" contained in the CAAA ex79
cludes rescheduling of existing debts.
The CAAA also states that it is the policy of the U.S. to assist the
victims of apartheid "to overcome the handicaps imposed on them by
74. S.C. Res. 569, U.N. Doc. S/RES/569 (1985).
75. Decision 86/459/ECSC, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 268) 1 (1986) (suspending imports
of certain iron and steel products from South Africa); Council Regulation No. 3302/86, 29 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 305) 11 (1986) (suspending imports of gold coins from South Africa); Decision 86/517/EEC, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 305) 45 (1986) (suspending new direct investments in South Africa).
76. The Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa, Oct. 20, 1985 (threatening, inter alia, to
ban investments in South Africa and to terminate double tax treaties with South Africa); Communique of Commonwealth Heads of Government Review Meeting, London, Aug. 3-5, 1986 (committing Member States to implement sanctions specified in the 1985 Accord and to ban all new
loans to South Africa and imports of South Africa uranium, iron, steel, and coal). The Accord
and Communique are reprinted in BACKGROUND MATERIALS FOR COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, 4th Meeting, Canberra, Australia (Aug. 79, 1989) (Australian Overseas Information Service).
77. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (1988). The implementing regulations can be found in 31 C.F.R.
§ 545. For general discussion of the CAAA, see Nagan, Economic Sanctions, U.S. Foreign Policy, International Law and The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 4 FLA. INT'L. L. J. 85 (1988);
Clarizio, Clements, & Geetter, United States Policy Toward South Africa, 11 HUM. RTs. Q. 249
(1989). See also Butcher, The Unique Nature of Sanctions Against South Africa, and Resulting
Enforcement Issues, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 821 (1987)
78. 22 U.S.C. § 5013(a) (1988).
79. 22 U.S.C. § 5001(3) (1988) states that "the term loan does not include... rescheduling of
existing loans, if no new funds or credits are thereby extended to a South African entity or the
Government of South Africa."

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 12:647

the system of apartheid and to help prepare them for their rightful
roles as full participants in the political, social, economic, and intellectual life of their country. '80 To this end, the CAAA permits private
loans, donations, and investments in black-owned businesses and in
projects designed to assist the victims of apartheid.8 ' The Act imposes
no affirmative obligation on banks with outstanding South African
credits either to use a portion of their renegotiated credits for this purpose, or to take these objectives into consideration in their future treatment of their outstanding South African credits.. The anti-apartheid
movement has not made any concerted effort to get the banks to use
their renegotiated South African credits for these purposes.
THE SECOND INTERIM ARRANGEMENT

When the first interim arrangement expired, South Africa's financial position was improving and the SAG's political crackdown had
succeeded in shielding the country's political crisis from international
attention. 2 Given this reduction in political and financial pressure,
the banks, despite calls from South African anti-apartheid activists not
to reach a new arrangement with the SAG unless certain political conditions were met, concluded a second interim arrangement with the
SAG in March 1987.83
This three year arrangement, which terminated on June 30, 1990,
continued the basic framework of the first arrangement. It contained
no grace period and required repayment of $1.42 billion (thirteen percent) of the outstanding affected debt.8 4 The interest rate charged depended on whether the banks reached an agreement with their original
borrower or took advantage of the special restricted accounts with the
80. 22 U.S.C. § 5013(a) (1988).
81. 22 U.S.C. § 5013(b) (1988). The regulations stipulate that charitable contributions will
not be treated as prohibited "new investments," 31 C.F.R. § 545.421 (1990), and states that
specific licenses may be issued to financial institutions interested in making otherwise prohibited
loans where it is determined that "the loans will improve the welfare or expand the economic
opportunities of persons in South Africa disadvantaged by the apartheid system." 31 C.F.R.
§ 545.503 (1990). Neither the regulations nor the statute explain the standards to be used in
making this determination.
82. See K. OVENDEN & T. COLE, APARTHEID AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 90-91
(1989); Hirsch, supra, note 34,'at 277-79.
83. Hirsh, supra note 34, at 275. See also G. HUFBAUER, J. SCHOTT, & K. ELLIOT, supra
note 7, at 229.
84. G. HUFBAUER, J. SCHO'Fr, & K. ELLIOT, supra note 7, at 229. This agreement consists
of a letter from the South African Minister of Finance to the banks, dated March 25, 1987, that
sets out the terms of the arrangement and stipulates that each letter to each bank is a separate
offer which the bank may accept by acknowledging receipt of the letter. Second Interim Arrangement Letter. Appended to the letter was a technical memorandum that discussed how the interim
arrangement would operate. Aspects of the Second Interim Arrangements [hereinafter Technical
Memorandum].
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PIC, that paid an interest rate of seven-eighths of one percent over the
relevant market interest rate.8 5 The SAG continued to have access to
these funds subject to the statutory mandate of the PIC8 6 and to the
terms of arrangement, according to which the SAG was the obligor on
87
these debts.
The Second Interim Arrangement also established two mechanisms through which creditors could "exit" the Interim Arrangement.
First, the banks could convert their loans into ten year exit loans that
would not be subject to any future rescheduling. 8 These exit loans, on
which the borrower pays an interest rate of one and five-eighths to one
and seven-eighths percent over Libor and a fee of three-eighths of one
percent, include a mid-term two year grace period with repayment
over five years, that was designed to help the SAG reduce an anticipated 1990-91 debt repayment hump. About $5 billion of debt has
89
been converted into these exit loans.
The second mechanism was a debt-equity conversion through
which the banks could convert their funds into investments in South
African enterprises. These investments can be liquidated and the
funds taken out of the country through the sale of Financial Rands. 9°
About $600 million of debt has been converted through this
mechanism. 9 '
THE THIRD INTERIM ARRANGEMENT

In mid-1989 the anti-apartheid movement began to prepare for the
negotiation of a Third Interim Arrangement that would be required
when the Second Interim Arrangement terminated in June 1990. Its
objective was to convince the banks to condition a Third Interim Arrangement on SAG agreement to dismantle apartheid and negotiate
85. See Technical Memorandum, supra note 84, § 8. The special restricted accounts are
credited to the original creditor who is paid out according to the terms of the Interim Arrangement. As long as the funds were actually held in the accounts, they were available to the SAG,
that could use the funds to finance public sector securities. See Second Interim Arrangements
Letter, supra note 84, § 7.01(c).
86. See Public Investment Commissioner's Act, Stat. of S. Aft. No. 45 of 1984; The Department of Finance, supra note 71, at 109-16.
87. See Technical Memorandum, supra note 84, § 1. See also id., Appendix A § 4.1.
88. See id., § 12.
89. See Tommey, Outlook for Foreign Funding Improving, The Star, June 6, 1990; S. Fidler,
Lenders Take Up S. African Exit Option, The Financial Times, May 16, 1989, at 4. In May 1989,
only $3.5 billion had been converted to exit loans.
90. Technical Memorandum, supra note 84, § 6. The financial rand which trades at a discount to the commercial rand, cannot be transferred out of South Africa. This means that any
sale of financial rands represents merely a change in ownership and no net outflow of funds from
South Africa. See The Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Limited, supra note 60, at 339-40.
91. See Tommey, supra note 89; Fidler, supra note 89, at 4.
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with the democratic forces on the establishment of a nonracial demo92
cratic constitutional order in South Africa.
The timing seemed propitious. The democratic forces appeared to
be regrouping from the blows they had suffered when the state of
emergency was declared, and the South African economy was again in
deep crisis. 93 The country was clearly suffering from the financial
sanctions that had been imposed by the transnational commercial
banks in 1985, that effectively denied South African borrowers access
to international financial markets, and from the international sanctions campaign, that reduced South African access to traditional markets in the United States and Europe and raised its overall cost of
doing business. 94 It was well known that South Africa could not repay
the US$8 billion that would fall due when the Second Interim Arrangement terminated. 95 In addition, the country had substantial obligations falling due in 1990-91 on debt outside the scope of the
96
interim arrangement.
The SAG, therefore, urgently needed debt relief if it was to avoid a
recurrence of the 1985 crisis. This appeared to give the banks great
leverage over the SAG. 97 The anti-apartheid movement argued that
the banks should use this leverage to help end apartheid. It contended
that the banks could do this by denying the SAG debt relief unless the
92. In April 1989 four South African churchmen, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Dr. Allen
Boesak, Dr. Beyers Naude, and Reverend Frank Chikane, issued an appeal to fourteen creditor
banks not to reschedule South Africa's debt unless five conditions were met. They were that the
SAG must end the state of emergency, release all political prisoners and detainees, unban all
political organizations, repeal all racist legislation, including the Group Areas Act, the Land
Acts, the Separate Amenities Acts and the Population Registration Act, and establish a process
for negotiating a new constitution for a non-racial, democratic, and unitary South Africa. These
demands were taken up by the anti-apartheid movement. See COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF
FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTH AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA: THE SANCTIONS REPORT (1989)

[hereinafter SANCTIONS REPORT]; Rescheduling South Africa's Debt: Hearing before the Subcomm. on InternationalDevelopment, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy of the Comm. on
Banking, Finance,and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 101-45 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings]
(Statement of Terry Crawford-Browne and Additional Materials Submitted for the Record); Divestment and Non-Equity Links by TransnationalCorporationsin South Africa, Report of the U.N.
Centre on TransnationalCorporations,U.N. Doc. E/C.10/AC.4/1989/2 (1989) [hereinafter Divestment Report].
93. See Statement of John Lind in Hearings,supra note 92, at 76-77; Joffe, Economics Not
Faith Tell Churchmen Where To Apply Pressure,The Weekly Mall (Johannesburg, South Africa),
June 23-29, 1989, at 15.
94. See SANCTIONS REPORT, supra note 92, at 38-45. See also R. BETHLEHEM, supra note
28.
95. See sources cited supra note 93; Divestment Report, supra note 92, at 2, 13; K. OVENDEN
& T. COLE, supra note 82, at 75-98.
96. The country's total repayment obligations for 1990-91 were estimated to be between $1.5
and 2.0 billion per year. See Divestment Report, supra note 92, at 2, 13; Statement of John Lind
in Hearings,supra note 92, at 77.
97. For a detailed discussion of commercial bank exposure to South Africa, see Divestment
Report, supra note 92.
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government made specific political concessions that in effect amounted
98
to a committment to dismantle apartheid.
Unfortunately, the anti-apartheid movement's strategy was based
on an overly optimistic assessment of the bargaining position of the
banks and an underestimation of the forces propelling them to reach
an agreement with SAG. In 1989 the banks were facing serious
problems with their outstanding debts to developing countries, which
were accumulating substantial arrears. 99 Domestically, many banks
were beginning to experience significant problems with other parts of
their loan portfolios.' °° The banks were also concerned with raising
capital to meet new capital adequacy requirements.10 ' Consequently,
they were in no mood to create new problems with one of the few
debtor countries that was meeting its renegotiated debt obligations in a
timely fashion.
The strategy also ignored the banks' reluctance to attach policyrelated conditions to debt renegotiations. Banks had tried this, with a
notable lack of success, in Peru in the mid-1970s. In that case, the
banks forced Peru to accept certain policy reforms as a condition for
rescheduling its debt, but had been unable to enforce the conditions
when the government failed to implement them. 10 2 This experience
persuaded the banks to rely on the IMF to promote policy reforms in
03
troubled debtor countries.'
98. See sources cited supra note 92.
99. In 1989 total arrears on developing country debt was $79 billion, equal to 6.4% of total
debt. About half of this was owed to private creditors. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEBT
TABLES, 1990-91, at 22 (1990).
100. For a discussion of the problem in the U.S. banking industry, see SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, SUPERVISION, REGULATION, AND INSURANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., THE BANKING INDUSTRY
IN TURMOIL: A REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY AND THE
BANK INSURANCE FUND 81 (Comm. Print 1990).
101. See COMM. ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (Dec. 1987), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 530, 547-49
(1988) [hereinafter PROPOSAL FOR CONVERGENCE]. These rules, which are implemented by

national bank regulators, require banks by 1992 to have minimum capital levels equal to at least
8% of total risk-adjusted assets. Of this at least 4% must be core capital that consists of equity
plus disclosed reserves. The banks were required to meet an intermediary standard of 7.25%, of
which at least half should be core capital, by Dec. 31, 1990. Id. This meant that in 1989-90 most
of South Africa's commercial bank creditors were concerned with raising capital at a time of
falling income levels and rising levels of problem loans.
102. See R. PLAN, EXTERNAL DEBT RESCHEDULING 58-61 (Law, Economics, International
Trade, Vol. 8, 1985). The banks had experienced similar problems in their attempts to renegotiate the obligations of the German government in the 1920s and '30s. See R. CHERNOW, THE
HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FI-

(1990) (material at 392-99 is particularly pertinent).
103. The IMF, for political and legal reasons, could not play such a role in South Africa. See
sources cited supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
NANCE
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Even if the banks had been willing to impose tough political conditions on SAG, it is not clear how successful the strategy would have
been. A South African debtor intent on evading its financial obligations knew when these obligations would mature and when the banks
would be entitled to take legal action against it. Consequently, the
debtor could easily protect itself against creditor action by moving its
assets out of vulnerable jurisdictions prior to the maturation date of
the debt obligations and by utilizing the country's substantial sanctions-busting experience to avoid future problems. Even if the creditors were able to locate attachable South African assets, their ability to
attach these assets could be complicated by a mismatch between the
identity of their obligor and of the legal owners of the attachable assets. 1 4 Under these circumstances, the banks would be unlikely to
view judicial action against South Africa, which would be expensive
and time-consuming, as desirable or cost-efficient.
Furthermore, by 1989, the SAG knew it could not expect new
money from the banks and so had little incentive to accede to bank
demands, including calls for political reforms, that it viewed as unreasonable.10 5 While there are obvious costs associated with such a strategy, it would have enabled the SAG to both avoid troublesome
demands and keep the foreign exchange it owed to the banks. The
SAG could have further strengthened its position by rewarding those
banks that were willing to be more accommodating. 06
The strategy was also based on an overestimation of the role
played by the international sanctions campaign in South Africa's debt
problems. Despite international pressure, banks had continued lending money to South African entities until late 1984. As discussed
above, their refusal in August 1985 to roll-over their South African
loans was primarily due to financial factors. The political forces that
influenced their 1985 decision to stop lending to South Africa were
largely generated within South Africa by the trade unions and the
104. See Hercaire International, Inc. v. Argentina, 821 F.2d 559 (1 1th Cir 1987) (Judgment
against foreign sovereign could not be enforced against the assets of the State-owned airlines even
though the foreign sovereign owned 100% of the airlines.)
105. See Recent Developments in South Africa and H.R. 3458: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on International Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs and the Subcomm. on Africa of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 101-79 (1990) [hereinafter Recent Developments] (Statements of Rodney B. Wagner, Vice Chairman, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company,
and John J. Simone, Executive Vice-President, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company). Some
South African commentators had begun to argue for a "unilateral rescheduling." See Ensor, SA
Should Withdraw From Onerous Debt Arrangements-Academics, Business Day (Johannesburg,
South Africa), Dec. 29, 1989, at 5.
106. On sovereign default strategies, see generally A. KALETSKY, THE COSTS OF DEFAULT
(1985).
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member organizations of the United Democratic Front. t0 7
The banks were able to use these weaknesses in the anti-apartheid
movement's strategy to portray the strategy as financially naive and
unworkable.10 This enabled them to base the South African debt negotiations on their own profit-maximizing criteria and to justify the
results as being the most "feasible" under the circumstances.
In fact, the banks' position was subject to significant challenge.
They had originally loaned money to South African borrowers despite
clear evidence of the economic irrationality of apartheid and of the
profound political problems that it caused.1t 9 It was also apparent
that these factors were the primary cause of the country's debt
problems and that between the 1985 and the 1989 negotiations there
had been no real changes in the political and economic structure of the
country. 10 The banks' outstanding South African credits, which by
1989 had been converted from short term into medium term credits,
were as much at risk in 1989 as they were in 1985.
In reality, the government's major economic achievement up to
that point was that it had managed to make timely payment of all its
debt obligations. However, the impressiveness of this feat is substantially diminished when one remembers that Ceausescu's Romania
managed a similar feat."'
The anti-apartheid movement's failure to raise these issues allowed
the banks to avoid justifying their treatment of South African debt in
terms of their own prudence as bankers. The anti-apartheid movement also lost an opportunity to engage the banks in a discussion on
how the debt, which was trapped in South Africa, could be used to
promote appropriate socioeconomic development in South Africa.
The result was that in October 1989 the SAG and the banks announced that they had concluded a third interim arrangement that
followed lines similar to that of the second agreement. 12 The arrange107. See sources cited supra note 52 and accompanying text.

108. See. e.g., Statements of Rodney B. Wagner and John J. Simone in Recent Developments,
supra note 105.
109. See discussion of South Africa's political economy, supra notes 14-32 and accompanying text.
110. See sources cited supra notes 14-15. During this period President P. W. Botha remained
in power and the country was still under a state of emergency.

I ll. For a discussion of Romania's debt, see Note, U.S.-Romanian Trade: Foreign Debt,
Trade Barriers,and Future Problems and Prospects, 21 LAW. & POL'Y. INT'L Bus. 73 (1989).
112. The agreement was implemented through a bank acknowledgement of the receipt of a
letter dated October 23, 1989 and the accompanying technical memorandum from the South
African Minister of Finance. The 31A year agreement, beginning in July 1990, covers U.S. $8
billion in loans and continues the interest rates applicable under the second interim arrangement
and provides for the same relending and exit loan options available under the Second Interim
Arrangement. According to the arrangement, South Africa will repay about $1.5 billion of the
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ment significantly alleviated the financial pressure on the SAG and has
led to new financing prospects for South Africa."1 3
The third arrangement was publicly announced on October 19 as
the leaders of the Commonwealth Nations were meeting in Australia
to discuss the question of strengthening sanctions against South Africa."1 4 The timing could hardly have been coincidental and is indicative of the strength of the SAG's bargaining position.I' 5 While the
banks clearly had their own reasons for wanting to reach an arrangement with the SAG, there was no compelling reason for the banks to
conclude an agreement more than six months prior to the expiration of
the Second Interim Arrangement.
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

Since the announcement of the Third Interim Arrangement, and in
light of the recent developments in South Africa, the international
anti-apartheid movement has adopted a "wait and see" policy that includes the maintenance of existing sanctions, " 6 and keeping the mechanisms for a future ratcheting up of the financial sanctions campaign
7
in reserve." 1
debt over the life of the arrangement. This means that South Africa could still owe $6.5 billion
when the agreement terminates on December 31, 1993. See the discussion of the Third Interim
Arrangement, supra notes 92-115 and accompanying text. On the financial consequences of the
Third Interim Arrangement, see J. LIND, THE NEW INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
BANKS AND SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (CANICCOR Research 1989); Tommey,
supra note 89.
113. See Swiss Roll-overs, Financial Mail, Nov. 16, 1990, at 37.
114. See Erlanger, Group Seeks New Ways to PressureSouth Africa, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20,
1989, at D6; Wren, Pretoria and Banks Reach Pact, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1989, at DI.
115. Fabricius & Heystek, South Africa Wins Debt Rollover Battle, The Star (Johannesburg,
South Africa), Oct. 25, 1989, at 17.
116. At its Consultative Conference in December 1990, the ANC also called for the continuation of sanctions. See Van Niekerk, Grim Ordeal-but ANC Emerges Stronger, The Weekly
Mail (Johannesburg, South Africa), Dec. 20, 1990-Jan. 10, 1991, at 7, 8. This approach was
modified at the ANC's July 1991 conference. Reportedly, the ANC is now considering supporting the lifting of sanctions in phases linked to certain, as yet unspecified and presumably unmet,
concessions by the SAG. See Wren, South Africa: New Reality, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1991, at Al.
A number of city councils in the United States are strengthening their sanctions. See, e.g.,
New York, N.Y., Dep't of Fin., Rules Relating to the Anti-Apartheid Classification of Banks,
CITY RECORD, July 10, 1991, at 1207-08. It should be noted that these rules encourage banks to
use their funds trapped in South Africa to support organizations promoting the transition to a
democratic post-apartheid South Africa. See id. § 4(17-19).
117. The leaders of the Commonwealth could still implement the proposals made by its panel
of independent experts if this newly begun South African negotiation process falters. This panel
of experts proposed a five year strategy for increasing financial sanctions that will ultimately cut
South Africa off from all trade credits and banking relationships and will, in effect, exclude the
country from the international financial system if it does not dismantle apartheid and establish,
through negotiation, a non-racial, democratic constitutional order for the country. See SANCTIONS REPORT, supra note 92, at 174-75. In the United States, a South African Financial Sanctions for Democracy Amendment Act designed to increase financial pressure on the SAG has
been proposed. See South African Financial Sanctions Act of 1989, H.R. 3458, 101st Cong., 1st
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The international anti-apartheid movement's failure to substantially influence the renegotiation of South Africa's debt has increased
its frustration with South Africa's creditors. As a result, some elements of the movement would like to see the banks punished for lending to South Africa even if this results in neither additional pressure
being imposed on the SAG nor in any discernible benefit to the people
of South Africa.
This is most clearly seen in the Financial Sanctions for Democracy
Amendment Act."18 Section 3 of the bill would require all U.S. nationals to sell their exit loans by December 31 , 1992. The effect of this
provision would be to force the holders to sell the loans at a steep
discount to non-U.S. investors. Since South Africa has been reliably
servicing its debt, these forced sales would give a windfall to the purchasers and impose costs on U.S. holders without imposing any additional costs on the South African debtors, whose debt service
obligations would remain unchanged.
There are many possible purchasers of the South African exit
loans, including speculators, investment banks, and other investors
less sensitive than commercial banks to pressure from the antiapartheid movement. In fact the purchaser could be acting for the
SAG, so the forced sale could actually bestow an undeserved benefit
on the SAG. Moreover, South Africa's non-U.S. creditors would feel
no pressure to buy the loans because, as long as they intend on holding
their credits to maturity, the value of their credits depends on the reliability of South Africa's debt service performance and not on the price
of South African debt in the secondary market." 9
A strategy which appears to punish South Africa's creditors is
Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. 7037-9 (1989). This bill was proposed in the 101st Congress by Rep.
Fauntroy. It is similar to the Commonwealth proposals in that it provides for time-triggered
financial sanctions that slowly exclude South Africa from the international financial system.
Recent Developments, supro note 105, at 170-88 (text of H.R. 3458). It could be resubmitted to
the 102d Congress.
118. Recent Developments, supra note 105, at 170-88 (text of H.R. 3458).
119. Similar considerations apply to Section 5 of H.R. 3458, which will prohibit U.S. banks
and their foreign branches and subsidiaries from offering correspondent banking services to
South African entities. Id. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOUTH AFRICA: RELATIONSHIP WITH WESTERN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, GAO/NSIAD-90-189 (June 7, 1990) at 14-15
(discussing correspondent banking relations and trade credits); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
DEBT RESCHEDULING AND POTENTIAL FOR FINANCIAL SANCTIONS, GAO/NSIAD-90-109BR

(Feb. 1990) at 8-10.
The effect of these provisions would obviously be much greater if other countries would impose similar conditions on their banks. In that case South Africa would find it difficult to replace
banking services lost as a result of this legislation and there would be a definite decrease in their
access to the international financial system. Such a strategy was proposed to the Commonwealth
but has not been adopted. See K. OVENDEN & T. COLE, supra note 82, at 187-205; SANCTIONS
REPORT, supra note 92, at 111-13, 136-37, 174.
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counterproductive. 20 Given the banks' public relations problem and
their interest in developing links to the people and organizations that
could be the leaders of a future non-racial democratic South Africa,
they should be willing to consider creative proposals regarding the
treatment of their South African debt. A creative anti-apartheid approach to the debt would seek to both maintain pressure on the SAG
and to use the debt to promote structural transformation in the South
African political economy. In this regard, one should not forget that
the dynamics of the apartheid system ensure that it is the victims of
apartheid who bear the burden of the debt, even though they have
received no real benefits from it.121
The next section will discuss how an alternate sanctions strategy
that creates opportunities for using debt for appropriate development
purposes could have been designed. Even though the third interim
arrangement has been concluded, elements of this strategy can still be
implemented because the country's creditors have outstanding assets
that are trapped in South Africa until at least December 1993.122
AN ALTERNATE STRATEGY FOR SOUTH AFRICAN DEBT

An alternate sanctions strategy must be based on the recognition
that sanctions will impose costs on South Africa that will continue to
affect the country after the sanctions are lifted. Many of the creditors
and investors who disinvested from South Africa will have developed
new business connections and will be wary of reinvesting before a predictable and profitable business environment exists in the country. In
addition, the country will need to devote resources to repairing the
domestic and international costs of sanctions. This will constrain its
23
development possibilities.'
120. The strategy also can adversely influence the actions of creditor governments. In December 1990, the European Community agreed to lift the prohibition on new investment in
South Africa despite a plea from Nelson Mandela, the ANC deputy-president, to maintain sanctions. See European Statement on South Africa, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1990, at 124. See also
Wren, DeKlerk's Surprise, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1991, at Al; Riding, Europeans Move to Lift
Pretoria Curbs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1991, at A3. In April 1991, the European Community,
ignoring the opposition of the ANC, agreed to lift its ban on the importation of South African

iron, steel, and gold coins. See Buchan, South Africa Steel and Gold Ban Lifted, The Financial
Times, Apr. 16, 1991, at 4, col. 4.
On July 10, 1991, President Bush terminated the sanctions imposed against South Africa by
the CAAA, but left in place all other sanctions, including those related to the IMF. See Exec.
Order No. 12,769 (July 10, 1991), and accompanying statement by President.
121. See sources cited supra note 8.
122. The debt covered by the Third Interim Arrangement is not expected to be fully repaid
before the expiration of the Arrangement on Dec. 31, 1993. See sources cited supra note 112.
123. See generally SANCTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID (M. Orkin ed. 1989); R. BETHLEHEM,
supra note 28; 1 INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS
ON SOUTH AFRICA: THE ECONOMY (1990).
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These costs could be minimized if the sanctions include a "development exception" that allows international financial and economic
transactions that support appropriate development opportunities that
may arise during the sanctions campaign.
Ensuring that these development efforts promote the structural
transformation of the South African political economy and do not deteriorate into disguised "sanctions-busting" requires a method for
identifying "appropriate development opportunities." Since the identification of "appropriate development" will itself influence socioeconomic activity after the sanctions campaign is over, the identification
method should respect the sovereign right of the South African people
to determine their own post-apartheid future. Consequently, the
method must be based on those internationally recognized and accepted standards of conduct that a post-apartheid South Africa will be
expected to observe. This would be consistent with the international
legal justification for sanctions against South Africa which is that
124
apartheid is a violation of international norms of conduct.
Since these development activities should result in an improvement
in the socioeconomic condition of the victims of apartheid, the identification method must incorporate the principles of sustainable, equitable development. 125 It must also be equally applicable to charitable,
community, and welfare projects and to commercial ventures that increase black participation in the South African economy.
A sanctions strategy with a development exception must include a
development financing mechanism that does not undermine the punitive goal of the sanctions. This mechanism should contain incentives
to encourage those who have financed the present apartheid political
economy to contribute to appropriate development activities, and
should be available to other public and private organizations interested
in funding appropriate development activities. The mechanism could
expand into a more comprehensive development assistance framework
for a post-apartheid South Africa.
It is not unreasonable to expect South Africa's creditors to contrib124. The United Nations has resolved that apartheid is inconsistent with the principles of the
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. S.C. Res. 181, 18
U.N. SCOR (1056th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc S/5386 (1963); S.C. Res. 182, 18 U.N. SCOR (1078th
mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. S/5471 (1963); S.C. Res. 191, 19 U.N. SCOR (I135th mtg.) at 13, U.N.
Doc. S/5773 (1964); S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR (2046th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc. S/12436

(1977). The General Assembly also adopted the International Convention on the Suppression
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid on November 30, 1973. G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015

U.N.T.S. 244, entered into force July 18, 1976. In total, the United Nations has adopted more
than 320 resolutions concerning apartheid. See K. TOMASEVSKI, supra note 5, at 84.
125. These principles are discussed in more detail infra notes 129-51 and accompanying text.
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ute to these development efforts. When the banks loaned money to
South African borrowers, they knew or should have known about the
structural weaknesses in the country's political economy and about the
need for structural adjustment in the economy.' 26 In addition, at the
time they loaned the money they knew or should have known that
South Africa, in fact, was unable to obtain IMF financing. 27 Consequently, the banks should have anticipated that in the event of the
country being unable to meet its debt obligations, they could be compelled to support structural adjustment in the country's political economy financially or risk losing their outstanding credits.
These elements of an alternate sanctions strategy can be implemented with or without creditor government participation. If creditor
governments are involved, they could require banks to disclose to the
relevant regulatory agencies how they are using their outstanding
South African credits. Alternatively, banking regulators could require
banks to either establish loss reserves against their South African credits, or finance appropriate development in South Africa. Such a reserve requirement can be justified on the grounds that bank exposure
to a debtor country, like South Africa, that has consistently failed to
adopt the adjustment policies needed to correct its socioeconomic
problems is a threat to the safety and soundness of the banks. The best
way for the banks to protect themselves against the risk of default by
such a borrower may be to use some of their outstanding credits to
fund development activities that promote appropriate socioeconomic
128
changes in the debtor country.
In the event that creditor governments do not participate in the
strategy, the anti-apartheid movement could establish a monitoring
committee which would collect information, serve as an information
clearing house, and help development projects and their sponsors lo-

cate sources of funds. The anti-apartheid movement could also use
shareholder resolutions and local consumer action to encourage banks
to cooperate with the strategy.
Each of the novel elements of this strategy-a method for identify-

ing "appropriate development" that includes developmental and
human rights guidelines, a development financing mechanism, and the
126. See discussion of South Africa's political economy supra notes 14-32 and accompanying
text.
127. See sources cited supra note 47.
128. In this regard it is important to remember that timely payment of debt obligations by
sovereign debtors with flawed political economies may not mean that bank assets are adequately
protected. It was purely fortuitous that banks were repaid their Romanian debt prior to the
overthrow of the Ceausescu dictatorship. See Note, supra note 11, at 71.
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means of encouraging creditor participation in this strategy-are discussed in more detail below.
IDENTIFYING "APPROPRIATE DEVELOPMENT"

The purpose of the method for identifying appropriate development is to help creditors and other interested parties identify projects
and project sponsors that will promote the socioeconomic development of the people of South Africa and that will help create a demo-

cratic order in the country. Qualifying projects must both promote
sustainable development and must meet international human rights
standards.
Since the SAG is part of the problem, the development criteria
must be based on the experiences of countries where development has
29 It
occurred without and even despite the efforts of government.'
must also be based on the development experience of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 130 While specific lessons will vary depending on the type of development project being considered,13 ' it appears
132
that successful projects share at least two characteristics.

The first is the importance of participation by the project beneficiaries in the design, implementation, and management of the
projects.133 This means that project sponsors must work with the project beneficiaries during the design phase of the project, that the pro-

ject structure must include channels for communication between
129. There are numerous examples of successful development projects that have occurred
without government support and even with its active opposition. See, e.g., A. HIRSCHMAN, GETTING AHEAD COLLECTIVELY: GRASSROOTS EXPERIENCES IN LATIN AMERICA (1984); H. DE
SOTO, supra note 14; S.Paul, Governments and Grass Roots Organizations: From Co-Existence to
Collaboration, in STRENGTHENING THE POOR: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED 61 (J. Lewis ed.
1988). For examples of such projects in South Africa, see F. WILSON & M. RAMPHELE, supra
note 15, at 279-92.
130. The term "non-governmental organization" includes all organizations that are privately
organized, managed, and financed. It includes commercial enterprises, trade unions, charitable,
welfare, educational, environmental, community, youth, consumer, and cultural organizations.
For discussion of the role of such organizations in development, see Durning, People Power and
Development, 76 FOREIGN POL'Y 66 (1989); M. CERNEA, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 40, 1988); G. GRAN,
DEVELOPMENT FOR PEOPLE (1983).
131. For a useful discussion of the lessons to be learned in social, economic, agriculture, and
health projects, see THE FIELD DIRECTORS' HANDBOOK: AN OXFAM MANUAL FOR DEVELOPMENT WORKERS (B. Pratt & J. Boyden eds. 1988) [hereinafter OXFAM MANUAL]; F. MOORE
LAPPE, J. COLLINS, & D. KINLEY, AID As OBSTACLE (1980).
132. See generally S.HELLINGER, D. HELLINGER & F. O'REGAN, AID FOR JUST DEVELOPMENT (1988). See also sources cited supra note 129.
133. For a discussion of the meaning of the right to participation, see Paul, International
Development Agencies, Human Rights and Humane Development Projects, 17 DEN. J. INT'L
LAW. & POL'Y 67, 108-13 (1988). See also AFRICAN CHARTER FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION
IN DEVELOPMENT (International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa 1990).
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project managers and project beneficiaries, and that the project beneficiaries must be able to hold the project managers accountable for their
actions. The organizational structures created by such projects will
benefit not only future development activities in South Africa but also
the anti-apartheid movement's efforts to end apartheid and create a
democratic political order in the country.
The second is that successful development projects are environmentally and managerially sustainable. Environmental sustainability
means, at a minimum, that the project does not lead to long term environmental degradation and that, where appropriate, the project design
includes a plan for assessing the environmental impact of the project
and for managing any environmental problems created by the project.134 Managerial sustainability means that the project design must
include plans for developing the financial and managerial capacity to
sustain the project once the initial support ends.' 35 Sustainability also
requires that the project design include an evaluation procedure. This
will ensure that the lessons learned from each project are available to
others and that the country develops a repository of development
36
know-how.
Furthermore, appropriate development projects must help create a
South Africa that conforms to internationally recognized standards of
conduct. While international human rights standards are applicable
to all societies and are not specifically designed to promote development, there is a growing recognition of the connection between human
rights and development and of the need to ensure that development
strategies do not involve an abrogation of human rights. 137 Therefore,
134. For a discussion of the importance of environmental sustainability to development, see
OUR COMMON FUTURE, REPORT OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DE-

VELOPMENT (1987). For a discussion of the environmental damage that apartheid has caused
and of the need for environmentally sustainable development in South Africa, see A. DURNING,
APARTHEID'S ENVIRONMENTAL TOLL (World Watch Paper No. 95, May 1990); B. HUNTLEY,
R. SIEGFRIED, & C. SUNTER, SOUTH AFRICAN ENVIRONMENTALISTS INTO THE 21ST CENTURY
43-123 (1989).

135. See S. HELLINGER, D. HELLINGER, & F. O'REGAN, supra note 132, at 33-47, 181-95.
See also sources cited supra notes 129-30. Foreign NGOs can play a useful role in helping develop local financial and managerial capacity. Appropriate development during the sanctions
campaign could, therefore, have provided an opportunity to develop links between democratic
organizations in South Africa and NGOs in both developing and industrialized countries. Such
links would assist development planning in the democratic South Africa that sanctions are helping to create. S. HELLINGER, D. HELLINGER, & F. O'REGAN, supra note 132, at 99.
136. For a discussion of the importance of evaluation procedures, see S. HELLINGER, D.
HELLINGER, & F. O'REGAN, supra note 132, at 143-44. See also OXFAM MANUAL, supra note
131, at 99-107, 127-33; F. MOORE LAPPE, J. COLLINS, & D. KINLEY, supra note 131, at 121.
137. There is an extensive literature on this subject. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT (G. Shepard & V. Nanda eds. 1985); HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT (D. Forsythe, ed. 1989); THE RIGHT TO FOOD (P. Alston & K. Tomasevski eds.
1984); Pronk, Development and Human Rights, in DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS IN DEVELOPMENT
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the definition of appropriate development projects should be based on
applicable international human rights instruments. 138 These are the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 39. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 14 the International Convenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,' 4 ' the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 42 the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 14 3 the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms
of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief,'"
and the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 4 5 The International Labor Organization's Conventions on the rights of industrial
and rural workers, which provide for rights of association and for "hu46
mane" working conditions, are also relevant.'
IN THE 1980's 1-24 (B. de Gaay Footman ed. 1981) (reprinted in United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development Reprint Series No. 18, 1981); Stewart, supra note 5; K. TOMASEVSKI,
supra note 5; Symposium on InternationalDevelopment Agencies, Human Rights and Environmental Considerations, 17 DEN. J. INT'L. LAW. & POL'Y 29 (1988); Paul, Rural Development,
Human Rights and ConstitutionalOrders in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1989 THIRD WORLD LEGAL
STUD. 57 (1989).
138. It should be noted that South Africa is not presently a signatory to any of the human
rights conventions. However, based on the statements of the democratic movement inside South
Africa, it is to be expected that a future democratic government will sign these Conventions,
which are consistent with the policies of the largest anti-apartheid movement. See, e.g., The
Freedom Charter,as adopted by the Congress of the People on June 26, 1955 which is the basic
policy document of the ANC. R. SUTTNER AND J. CRONIN, 30 YEARS OF THE FREEDOM

CHARTER 262 (1986). See also ANC Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa,
reprinted in A.N.C. DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL EDUCATION, THE ROAD TO PEACE: RESOURCE MATERIALS ON NEGOTIATIONS 23-40 (June 1990) [hereinafter ROAD TO PEACE]; Dec-

laration of the OAU Ad-hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa,
(The Harare Declaration), Harare, Zimbabwe, Aug. 21, 1989, reprinted in ROAD TO PEACE, id.
at 34-41; Resolution on Negotiations and the Constituent Assembly (adopted at the Conference
for a Democratic Future), reprinted in ROAD TO PEACE, id. at 72-73. While the SAG has not yet
formally released its own constitutional proposals, statements by government ministers suggest
that it will contain a bill of rights that incorporates universally recognized human rights. See
Breier, Two Bills of Rights Have Common Ground, The Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), May
15, 1991, at 3; Johnson, Viljoens Blueprint for New SA, The Star (Johannesburg, South Africa),
May 29, 1991, at 12.
139. G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
140. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (1966), openedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966 , 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
141. G.A. Res. 2200, annex, 21 GAOR Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 49 (1966), opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), entered intoforce Jan. 3, 1976.
142. G.A. Res. 2106, annex, 21 GAOR Supp. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014, at 47 (1965), opened for
signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966), entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.
143. G.A. Res. 180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1979), opened for signature Mar. 2, 1980,
1249 U.N.T.S. 14, entered intoforce Sept. 3, 1981.
144. G.A. Res. 55, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (1981), 21 I.L.M. 205 (1982), adopted without
vote on November 25, 1981.
145. Organization of Africa Unity Document CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981) (from the
OAU Ministerial Meeting on African Charter on Human and People's Rights, Banjul, The Gambia), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
146. ILO Conventions 14 and 87 deal with the rights of industrial workers, and ILO Conven-
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Based on these Conventions, appropriate development projects
should be undertaken by organizations that are committed to the principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national or
ethnic origin, religion, or political beliefs. Projects must also be
designed to provide benefits (which could be housing, education, agricultural services, health or legal services, credit, jobs, or welfare services) on a similar nondiscriminatory basis. In addition, the
development projects should be designed to ensure that all project beneficiaries have both access to the information necessary to ensure that
project design and management is consistent with their needs, and the
right to organize themselves to ensure that their concerns are ad147
dressed by project management.

In the specific context of a sanctions campaign, appropriate development projects must also be designed so as not to undercut the punitive aspects of the sanctions campaign. Sponsors of development
activities must be able to demonstrate that the project will not translate into disguised support for the SAG. This means that development
sponsors should not include SAG-affiliated organizations unless they
can demonstrate that the project is able to meet the other elements of
the definition of appropriate development.
Based on these considerations, it is possible to establish the following set of guidelines for identifying appropriate development projects
and project sponsors:
(a) the projects are undertaken by groups which can demonstrate
that they do not discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex,
religion, national or ethnic origin, or political beliefs;
(b) the projects are intended primarily to benefit disenfranchised
South Africans without regard to the gender, political or religious beliefs and affiliations, or national or ethnic origins of
the beneficiaries;

14 8

(c) neither the South African government nor organizations, including homeland and other authorities, that are financed or
tion 141 is concerned with the role of organizations of rural workers in economic and social
development: Convention Concerning the Application of the Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertaking, opened for signature Nov. 17, 1921, 38 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force May 28, 1947;
Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, opened
for signature July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17, entered intoforce July 4, 1950; Convention Concerning Organisations of Rural Workers and Their Role in Economic and Social Development
(1975), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15
(1982). See also Declaration of Principles and Programs of Action Adopted by the 1976 World
Employment Conference, World Employment Conference Doc. WEC/CW/E..
147. See Paul, supra note 133.
148. This criterion is designed to ensure that qualifying projects will seek to transform the
racial bias of the South African political economy.
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controlled by it, are involved in the design and management
of the projects or in the management of the sponsoring
organizations;
the project design includes mechanisms, such as channels of
communication, disclosure requirements, or management
structures, that will allow project beneficiaries to participate
in the design and operation of the project, to remain informed
about the operations of the project, and to hold the project's
management accountable for their project-related activities;
the project sponsors are able to demonstrate that they either
have the technical, managerial, and financial capacity to sustain the project after the initial funding is exhausted, or that
they have a plan of action for developing this capacity.
Where applicable, the plan must include a strategy for training local people to take over the responsibilities of outside
experts;
the project design includes an evaluation procedure that will
result in a project report that is available to project beneficiaries, funding agencies, and other non-governmental organizations; and
the project design includes an assessment of the project's environmental impact and a strategy for dealing with any damage caused by the project to the region's air, land, water, and

wildlife. 149
In addition to satisfying the objectives of a development-oriented
sanctions strategy, these guidelines are designed to be attractive to
both South African NGOs and to potential funding sources. The criteria are sufficiently flexible that they can be used by South Africa's
creditors who have funds covered by the Third Interim Arrangement
of South African debt, corporations that have blocked assets in South
Africa, and both commercial and grantmaking entities that are interested in getting involved in South Africa for the first time.
The generality of the definition means that it can be applied to a
wide range of development projects including health, education, legal
services, housing, rural development, small scale credit,I SOand job creation projects. The definition can also be applied to commercial yen149. Unlike the other criterion, the environmental criteria may not be applicable to all
projects. Many projects, such as technical training and welfare projects, are in themselves "environmentally neutral."
150. Wilson and Ramphele have pointed to the urgent need for mechanisms that will provide
credit to communities that historically have been denied access to credit. F. WILSON & M.
RAMPHELE, supra note 15, at 281-83. For a more recent discussion of South Africa's developmental needs, see M. SINCLAIR, supra note 32.
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tures, particularly those designed to promote black participation in the
formal economy.15 1 Hopefully, this flexibility will facilitate South Africa's development learning process. If necessary, the guidelines can
be refined as South Africa's development expertise grows.
One problem with these guidelines is that their generality raises the
possibility of abuse of the development exception to the sanctions.
This problem can be minimized by incorporating into the sanctions a
transparent funding process that includes a mechanism for monitoring
development financing activities.
A TRANSPARENT FUNDING PROCESS

Transnational bank creditors have gained experience in other
debtor countries that they could apply to funding appropriate development projects in South Africa. In some countries they have worked
with NGOs to convert debt into funding for environmental and development projects and for non-traditional exports. 5 2 They have also
had experience with "informal" debt conversions, in which private
sector debt is converted into equity investments without the participation of the government, and in relending schemes in which debt repaid
by the original borrower in local currency is reloaned to a new borrower in the debtor country. 53
These transactions usually take place in countries in which the
banks have an established presence or involve NGOs that are able to
convince the banks of their ability to successfully conclude sophisticated financial transactions. These conditions are not easily satisfied
in South Africa. Most of South Africa's creditors do not have an established presence there and do not have well-developed links to South
African NGOs or their supporters in the creditor countries. Consequently, they do not have the means to identify appropriate project
sponsors or development projects. 5 4 In addition, their history in
South Africa does not demonstrate a clear understanding of its developmental needs.
This suggests that a successful development-oriented sanctions
strategy must incorporate a mechanism for linking South Africa's
151. See Sethi, Economic Rights for the Disenfranchised Citizens of South Africa: A New
Approach to Black Economic Empowerment, 7 DEV. S. AFR. 17 (Feb. 1990).
152. See sources cited supra note 6.
153. See generally INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 3; UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, DEBT EQUITY CONVERSION: A GUIDE
FOR DECISIONMAKERS, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/104, U.N. Sales No. E.90.II.A.22 (1990).

154. This situation may be slowly changing as attention in South Africa begins to focus on
socioeconomic issues. See, e.g., Kifner, Planning is Begun on South African Aid Bank, N.Y.
Times, July 5, 1990, at A3.
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creditors and qualifying development projects. The mechanism could
be either a formal institutional structure, or an informal network of
155
contacts between interested parties.
A formal mechanism would require the creation of institutional
structures through which funds would flow from the banks to qualifying projects. For example, a coalition of NGOs in South Africa and
their counterpart organizations around the world could establish a
"Fund for Democratic Development in South Africa" (Fund).15 6 To
ensure that the organization promotes the types of activities that the
people of South Africa desire, its board of directors, staff, and advisors
should be drawn from both South African and non-South African
NGOs active in development and human rights work.
The Fund or a subsidiary should be incorporated in a creditor
country so that it can take advantage of any tax benefits available in
the creditor country. This would enable the banks to treat any extensions of credit to the Fund or its subsidiary as a domestic rather than a
South African credit. Without a specific exemption, the latter would
be subject to all reserve and other regulatory requirement applicable to
international and, particularly, South African credits.
The Fund would be authorized to arrange financing for qualified
development projects from sources both inside and outside South Africa. Consequently, it would be able to raise funds from South Africa's creditors and corporations with blocked assets in South Africa.
The Fund should be authorized to act as a direct supplier of financial
155. Both types of arrangements have been used in other debtor countries. Most debt for
nature or development conversions have arisen out of ad hoc arrangements between NGOs,
banks, and creditor governments. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6. However, a number of
NGOs have formed a Debt for Development Coalition and Foundation to promote such conversions. The Coalition and Foundation receives support from U.S.A.I.D.
156. A number of entities that could serve this function have been proposed. The South
African Development Bank has been proposed by Peter Goldmark of the Rockefeller Foundation and is supported by the ANC. See Kifner, supra note 154. The U.S. Commission on Southern Africa, proposed by Congressman Dymally, would be an independent entity with a board
appointed partially by the President and partially by Congress and would be mandated to raise
funds for human resource development in South Africa. See H.R. 721, 102d Congr., ist Sess.,
137 CONG. REC. H823 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1991). For the text of the bill, see House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., Report on H.R.2655: International Co-operation Act of
1989, at 165-67 (Comm. Print 1989) (text of bill is reprinted as Title XIII §§ 1301-1310). Ambassador Herman Nickel has proposed that Congress create an "American Foundation for a
Democratic South Africa" that would seek to raise funds for a range of development activities.
See U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, in POLICY CONSENSUS REPORTS (Johns Hopkins Foreign
Policy Institute, Jan. 1990). The European Community's Kagiso Trust, which presently relies on
official sources to fund human rights activities in South Africa, could be encouraged to tap private sources as well. The EC is considering broadening the mandate of the Kagiso Trust to
include funding development activities. See European Commission Proposes New Guidelines of
the Special Programme in Favour of Apartheid Victims, EUROPE (LUXEMBOURo), June 14, 1990
at 6bis (formerly EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN). There are also a number of efforts presently
underway that are designed to create such an entity inside South Africa.

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

(Vol. 12:647

assets to and a guarantor for sponsors of qualifying development
projects. Further, it should be empowered to act as a merchant
banker that arranges for creditors and donors to directly fund qualifying projects. The Fund could also coordinate technical assistance and
development information for South African NGOs.' 57
In order to ensure that the financing mechanism's operations conform to other elements of the sanctions strategy, the Fund and any
other participating funding organizations should be required to give
public reports on their activities. These reports could then be used by
anti-apartheid organizations and other interested parties to monitor
58
the activities of all participants in the process.'
Informal mechanisms, which could coexist with a formal mechanism, would rely on the existing network of NGOs in South Africa
and other countries to link banks with individual qualifying projects
and project sponsors. These organizations would have to play the role
of monitor of the system and facilitator of the financing arrangements.
This places a much greater burden on NGOs, which would be responsible for both identifying the qualifying projects and helping to arrange
financing packages.
ENCOURAGING BANK CONTRIBUTIONS TO APPROPRIATE
DEVELOPMENT

The history of bank lending in South Africa does not demonstrate
that banks have an interest in promoting appropriate development
here.15 9 It is, therefore, realistic to assume that a successful development exception to a sanctions strategy would need to both monitor
bank compliance with the strategy and give banks an incentive to contribute funds to appropriate development projects.
The choice of a particular compliance mechanism depends on the
role creditor governments play in the sanctions strategy. If they are
active participants, the compliance mechanism should focus on regula157. South Africa's creditors could be a useful source of technical assistance to certain qualifying projects. They could provide business and financial skills training for project managers and
beneficiaries. One benefit of such assistance would be to develop links between NGOs in South
Africa and the banking community that could have spill-over political benefits for the democratic
movement in the country.
158. Such reports may be legally required by the place of incorporation of the organizations.
For example, in the United States, most U.S. tax-exempt, non-profit corporations are required to
make annual reports to the Internal Revenue Service. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1990). For implementing regulations, see 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)(1) (1990).
159. International capital, including bank loans, was used to finance the development of
South Africa's mining and industrial sectors and to support the public sector, particularly in the
1970s. See, e.g., S. LEWIS, supra note 14, at 62-72. The costs of this development process have
been discussed supra notes 14-32 and accompanying text.
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tory measures, particularly bank reserve and disclosure requirements.
The justification for these requirements is that they are designed to
protect the safety and soundness of the banks from the risks arising
from their outstanding South African credits. If creditor governments
do not participate, the mechanism should involve careful monitoring
by NGOs of bank action, voluntary bank disclosure requirements, and
shareholder and consumer action.
Compliance mechanisms can operate independently of other elements of the sanctions. If sanctions are dismantled while creditor
funds remain blocked in South Africa, the compliance mechanism can
still be used to encourage creditors to contribute funds towards appropriate development activities in South Africa. The various compliance
mechanisms are discussed below.
RESERVE CRITERIA

It is now well understood that the apartheid system is the primary
cause of South Africa's financial predicament. 16° Consequently, until
apartheid is replaced by a more equitable and sustainable political and
economic system, regulators in creditor countries cannot have complete confidence in South Africa's ability to meet all of its financial
obligations in a timely fashion. Banking regulators should, therefore,
require banks to protect themselves against the risk of nonpayment by
either maintaining loss reserves against their South African credits or
by helping to finance appropriate development projects that will help
create such order in South Africa.
Since reserves are charged against a bank's income and adversely
affect its income statements, a reserve requirement could act as a significant incentive for the banks to contribute funds to qualifying development projects. 16' This incentive would be enhanced if the banks'
62
reserves were not tax deductible.'
160. For the background on the South African debt crisis, see supra notes 33-67 and accompanying text.
161. The accounting and tax treatment of reserves varies from country to country, but in all
cases, reserve requirements are viewed negatively by banks. For a general discussion of the tax
and accounting treatment of bank reserves in creditor countries, see J. HAY & M. BOUCHET,
THE TAX, ACCOUNTING AND REGULATORY TREATMENT OF SOVEREIGN DEBT (Cofinancing
and Financial Services Dept of the World Bank, Sept. 1989). Until December of 1990 the full
amount of the general reserves could be included in regulatory capital. However, under the
PROPOSAL FOR CONVERGENCE, supra note 101, at 537-38, general reserves will constitute a
declining portion of regulatory capital. Since the end of 1990, general reserves in excess of 1.5%
of risk-weighted assets are excluded from capital and by the end of 1992 this should be reduced
to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. Id. at 538-46.
162. In the United States, most bank loss reserves are not tax deductible but Allocated
Transfer Risk Reserves, which are special reserves banks are required to establish against valueimpaired country debt, are tax deductible. 12 U.S.C. § 3904 (1990); 12 C.F.R. § 211.43 (1990).
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A reserve requirement designed to encourage specific bank actions

is not unprecedented. In the United States, section 905A of the "Foreign Debt Reserving Act of 1989"163 seeks to have additional general
reserve requirements imposed on banks that do not participate in debt
64
reduction arrangements for troubled debtor countries.1
Furthermore, two countries already require their banks to maintain reserves against their South African credits. The Bank of England, under its matrix system for treatment of sovereign debt, 65 and
the German Federal Banking Supervisory Office' 66 require banks to

maintain reserves against South African debt. In addition, the banking supervisors in Canada and France require their banks to maintain
reserves against their exposure to a number of sovereign debtors which
167
in both cases includes South Africa.
There are a number of factors that are relevant to determining the
appropriate size of the reserves that the banks should maintain against
their South African assets. The most important is that the purpose of
the reserves is to give the banks an incentive both to fund appropriate
development activity and to ensure that they get full and timely debt
service from South African debtors. Therefore, the reserve requirement should not be so high as to cause the banks to lose interest in
South Africa so that they sell their debts at a substantial discount or to
demand such onerous terms from their South African debtors that
they are likely to default. Other relevant factors are the total amount
of the exposure to South Africa of all banks in the relevant country,
the amount that regulators would like to see banks contribute to appropriate development projects, 68 and the steps South Africa is taking
to correct the labor and capital supply rigidities that have effectively
69
rendered it ineligible for IMF financial support.'
163. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3912 (1990); Pub. L. No. 101-240, 103 Stat. 2501 (Dec. 19, 1989).
164. For general discussion of the regulatory issues raised by debt reduction arrangements,
see J.HAY & M. BOUCHET, supra note 161 (particularly pertinent are pp.19-21, 39-40, 51-53 and
72-73). See also INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 3.

165. See K. OVENDEN & T. COLE, supra note 82, at 129. In 1989 this reserve was equal to 515% of outstanding credits. For a discussion of the matrix system, see J.HAY & M. BOUCHET,
supra note 161, at 77-86.
166. The Federal Banking Supervisory Office requires the banks to maintain special reserves
against their loans outstanding to certain debtor countries, but leaves it to the banks to determine
the level of the reserves. In 1989, the German banks had established reserves equal to 25-40% of
their South African credits. See J.HAY & M. BOUCHET, supra note 161, at 59-65; K. OVENDEN
& T. COLE, supra note 82, at 132.
167. See J.HAY & M. BOUCHET, supra note 161, at 35-45 (for information on Canada); id. at
47-56 (for information on France).
168. In order to give the banks an incentive to make the contribution, the size of the required
contribution should be smaller than the size of the reserve requirement.
169. This factor is based on 22 U.S.C. § 286aa (1988) and on the assumption that the reliabil-
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DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

An alternative or supplementary approach to the reserve requirements is to require the banks to disclose specifically to the relevant
banking regulators how they are using their outstanding South African credits to support structural adjustment in South Africa. This information should be publicly available so that organizations in South
Africa and their international supporters can use it to identify possible
sources of funds for appropriate development projects.
A disclosure requirement would not cause significant regulatory
change in the United States. Most of South Africa's creditors already
disclose significant amounts of information to banking regulators and,
as publically traded companies, to the Securities Exchange Commission.170 However, banks are required to disclose very little specific
information about their South African credits.' 7 1 They do not include
such information as the size of the bank's special restricted accounts
with the Permanent Investment Commissions. 7 2 These disclosures,
therefore, do not provide sufficient information for anti-apartheid organizations interested in identifying possible sources of appropriate development financing.
For the disclosures to be useful to organizations that sponsor appropriate development in South Africa, each bank should provide the
following information:
(a) the level of its financial exposure to South Africa;
(b) whether that exposure is debt covered by the Third Interim
Debt Rescheduling Arrangement and its predecessor agreements and, if so, whether it is still debt outstanding to the
original debtor, a new corporate debtor, or is maintained in
the Special Restricted Accounts with the Permanent Investment Commissioners, or is ten year exit loans;
(c) whether credits not covered by the Rescheduling Arrangeity of South Africa as a debtor must improve when it becomes eligible for IMF support. See also
Morell, supra note 47, at 4-7.
170. For a general discussion of bank disclosure requirements, see Coombe & Lapic, Problem
Loans, Foreign Outstandings and Other Developments in Bank Disclosure, 40 Bus. LAW. 485
(1985).
171. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.9-01 through § 210.9-07 (dealing with bank holding company disclosure requirements). See also J. P. MORGAN & Co., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (1990);
CITICORP, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 29 (1990). These disclosures give information on the amount
of the banks' exposure in South Africa but not on how the bank is using these assets. Also,

Citicorp's 10-Q Form does not discuss any details about the Third Interim Arrangement. CIT]CORP, FORM 10-Q (1990). The FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL,
STATISTICAL RELEASE (Jan. 9, 1991) only gives aggregated bank information.

172. For information on the PIC and the special restricted accounts, see supra note 73 and
accompanying text.
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ment have been extended to the South African public or private sector;
(d) whether it has any other blocked assets in South Africa;
(e) whether the bank has provided funding to any appropriate
development projects in South Africa and, if so, the amount
of such credits, the nature of the funded activity, and information demonstrating that the recipients of the funds satisfy
the requirements for certification as an appropriate development project; 173 and
(f) what other steps it is taking to support appropriate development projects.
For these purposes, "financial exposure" should be defined to
mean any loan, as defined in section 5001(3) of the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act, 174 plus any blocked assets. "Blocked assets"
should be defined as (a) royalties, dividends, and capital repayments
that are due to persons not residents of South Africa but that cannot
or have not been taken out of South Africa because of the operation of
South African exchange control regulations, and (b) any other payments due to persons not residents of South Africa that are presently
on deposit with a bank in South Africa or an agency or instrumentality of the SAG.
This definition of "financial exposure" covers non-financial transnational corporations with blocked assets in South Africa. There is no
reason that such corporations should not be encouraged to contribute
some of their assets to appropriate development projects. Thus, publicly traded corporations should also be required to include the above
disclosures in their annual reports.
If creditor governments do not participate and the compliance program has to be privately "imposed," anti-apartheid organizations
should establish a set of disclosure requirements, based on many of the
above requirements, that banks could voluntarily adopt. 75 An independent monitoring group could then compile a public report that
development-oriented anti-apartheid groups could use to identify pos76
sible sources of funds for appropriate development.1
173. This disclosure could be structured to ensure that the confidentiality of fund recipients
and business proprietary information is respected.
174. 22 U.S.C. § 5001(3) (1990).
175. Many banks already have voluntary disclosure codes that can easily be amended by

concerned banks to include increased disclosure on South Africa. See Coombe & Lapic, supra
note 170, at 488.
176. There are already numerous organizations that monitor and publish information on
compliance with sanctions. They could perform this service with relative ease. For some information on the activities of these organizations, see J. HANLON AND R. OMOND, supra note 44, at
300-65 (1987). Last year, a Panel of Experts recommended to the Commonwealth that a small
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Both voluntary and involuntary disclosures are not unprecedented.
U.S. banks and corporations engaged in any act or transaction subject
to the terms of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act are required to
keep complete records on the transactions and to furnish them on demand to the Office of Foreign Assets Control. They are also required
to register any contributions to their controlled South African entities
1 77
and any investments in firms owned by black South Africans.
The signatories of the Sullivan Code have regularly disclosed the
actions they are taking to meet the standards of the Code to a private
firm. Each year the private firm publishes an annual "report card" on
17 8
the signatories' performance.
Finally, if the banks refuse to make voluntary disclosures, information can be obtained through questions at shareholder meetings and
1 79
through consumer actions against particularly recalcitrant banks.
Such activities could involve not only anti-apartheid groups, but development organizations, foundations that fund development in South
Africa, and investors who are concerned about the safety and soundness of banks with exposure to South Africa.
AMOUNT OF FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR APPROPRIATE

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

It is clear that successful use of the development exception to the
sanctions strategy requires a significant degree of coordination and
agreement among a wide range of organizations and entities. Determining whether or not it is a worthwhile effort depends on the amount
of funding it will generate and on its potential for contributing to appropriate development in a post-apartheid South Africa. There are
two things that affect an estimation of the amount of money that could
be made available for appropriate development during the period of
sanctions.
The first is that, since the development financing aspects of sanctions must be consistent with the goal of maintaining financial pressure on the South African government, the proposed creditors'
contribution to appropriate development should not be so onerous that
it would reduce the banks' incentive to take appropriate actions, insecretariat should be established to monitor compliance with sanctions. See SANCTIONS REPORT, supra note 92, at 173.

177. 31 C.F.R. §§ 545.601-545.604 (1990).
178. See INDUSTRY SUPPORT UNIT INC., 14TH

REPORT ON THE SIGNATORY COMPANIES TO
THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR SOUTH AFRICA (1990).

179. See Coombe & Lapic, supra note 170, at 487-88. This article suggests that information
can be obtained from a number of other sources including testimony and discovery incident to
litigation and unauthorized disclosures by employees.
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cluding judicial action, to fully enforce their rights against their South
African debtors. If banks perceive the contribution as unduly burdensome, there is a real risk that they could use it as an excuse to be less
vigilant in their oversight of their South African debts. This could
result in a defacto reduction in the foreign exchange obligations of the
South African government. Alternatively, it could result in the banks'
selling off their South African debt, even at steep discounts, to investors who may be less susceptible to anti-apartheid pressure or may
even be acting as agents of the South African government.
The second consideration is that any new funds brought into the
country will ultimately contribute to its foreign exchange reserves and
will therefore enhance the SAG's access to foreign exchange. 80 Consequently, any support for development should be generated from
funds presently inside the country or should be in the form of "inkind" support. Based on these considerations, special restricted accounts with the Permanent Investment Commissioners are the major
8
source of potential funds.' '
A second useful source could be the blocked assets of foreign investors. 182 However, tapping into this source is much more difficult because, unlike rescheduled debt, these assets are not subject to public
discussion and scrutiny. Their availability for appropriate development, therefore, depends on the goodwill of the individual asset
holders.
Using the special restricted accounts to fund appropriate development will have one positive and one negative consequence on the operation of the sanctions campaign. First, it will deprive the SAG of
funds that it has been using for certain public sector activities. 8 3 Second, the transfer of funds out of these accounts will reduce the SAG's
foreign exchange repayment obligations unless funds extended for de180. Under South Africa's foreign exchange control regulations only "authorized dealers,"
primarily banks, are allowed to buy or borrow foreign exchange without special permission. See
Du Plessis, supra note 59, at 24-27.
181. According to the March 1990 report of the Reserve Bank, there was R3869 million held
from unaccounted sources in PIC accounts. S. AFR. RESERVE BANK Q. BULL., supra note 28, at
S-44. It is reasonable to assume that the special restricted accounts constitute a significant portion of this. For information on these accounts, see sources cited supra note 64 and accompanying text. One commentator estimates that $386 million (about RI billion) of this is debt-related.
See Swiss Roll-Over, supra note 113, at 37.
182. The operation of the financial rand system and the foreign exchange regulations of
South Africa means that many corporations are unable to take all of their assets out of the
country as quickly as they would like. The result is that they have to maintain these assets in the
country until they are able to dispose of their Financial Rands to a willing foreign purchaser. See
The Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Limited, supra note 60; Du Plessis, supra note 52, at 34.
The SAG gives no information on the amount of blocked assets.
183. See sources cited supra note 71.
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velopment are repaid into these accounts. 8 4
With the above considerations as background, some estimate of the
amount of funds that could be available for development can be made.
The total payments due from South Africa to all creditors during the
term of the third interim arrangement, including payments on the ten
year exit loans, are expected to be between $1.1 and $1.7 billion per
year, of which U.S. banks will receive between $50 and $244 million
per year.' 85 Thus, if all creditors used only one percent of the annual
payments due to them to fund development projects in South Africa, it
would generate more than $10 million per year.186 This estimate does
not include possible contributions from holders of blocked assets.
Also, commercial ventures can qualify as appropriate development
projects. Consequently, banks may be persuaded by profit-making
possibilities to contribute a considerably higher portion of their funds
to appropriate development projects.
The size of the bank contributions could be increased by enabling
them to take advantage of any tax or other benefits that may be available under their domestic law.' 8 7 They could receive some reward for
making particularly generous contributions. For example, they could
take a deduction in their contribution requirement if the grant element
in their financing exceeds a stipulated percentage. 8 8 This could help
ensure that at least some funds are made available on better than commercial terms.
While the amount of funding may be small relative to South Af184. Id.
185. J. LIND, supra note 112, at 4. Lind estimates that total annual debt payments due from
South Africa will equal $2.2 billion in 1990, and $1.5 billion in 1991, 1992, and 1993, and that
total payments to U.S. banks will equal $50 million in 1990, $89 million in 1991, $138 million in
1992, and $244 million in 1993. Another commentator, Edward Osborn, chief economist of
Nedbank, estimates total payments at $1.7 billion in 1990, $2.1 billion in 1991, $1.1 billion in
1992, and $2.6 billion in 1993. See Swiss Roll-Overs, supra note 113, at 37.
186. This is equal to about R36 million at present exchange rates.
187. For example, in the United States, banks may be able to claim a tax deduction for any
funds that they donate to qualifying development projects. Whether or not this is possible will
depend on whether the recipient is registered as a charitable, educational, or religious organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(1990). This
means that qualifying recipient organizations will have to operate through a U.S. counterpart
even though the funds are used in South Africa. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(1990); INTERNAL REVENUE BULL., Rev. Rule 63-252, 1963-2, C.B. 101 (interpreting the language of I.R.S. § 170(c), and

noting situations where a charity organized in the United States can deduct contributions to
foreign charitable organizations). See also B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 815-19 (5th ed. 1987).
188. One possible method for. doing this would be to calculate the grant element according to

the formula used by the Development Assistance Committee of the O.E.C.D. This formula compares the present value of the future payments due on the financing with the face value of the
funds being provided. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT

CO-OPERATION: A REVIEW 171-73 (1985).
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rica's total development needs, it is significant to NGOs that are operating in a hostile political and economic environment. They can use
the funds to support projects that provide goods and services to the
victims of apartheid and that improve their development know-how
and organizational capacities. These projects will not only provide
some development assistance during sanctions, but will also help
South Africans prepare for a post-apartheid future. In this sense, the
resources can make a significant contribution to the structural adjustments required to create a democratic post-apartheid South Africa.
CONCLUSION

The above analysis demonstrates that South Africa's debt
problems have a lot in common with those of the debtor countries of
Latin America and Eastern Europe. Its debt problem, like theirs, was
caused by a flawed development strategy, mismanagement of the domestic economy, and unfavorable international economic and financial
developments. Similarly, the solution to South Africa's debt problem
depends on correcting those structural elements in the country's political economy that caused the debt problems and that inhibit sustainable development.
Viewed from this perspective, it is clear that financial sanctions
should have been perceived as part of a structural adjustment program
designed to promote the democratic, political, and socioeconomic
transformation of South Africa. Measured against this standard, the
financial sanctions campaign cannot be considered a success. While it
may have contributed to recent political changes in the country, the
campaign missed an opportunity to support appropriate development
activities in South Africa.
The sanctions campaign's failure was primarily caused by the antiapartheid movement's single-minded focus on the punitive potential of
the debt crisis.18 9 This led to an inaccurate assessment of the SAG's
and the banks' relative bargaining strengths. As a result, the sanctions
campaign failed to pay adequate attention to either the developmental
potential of sanctions or the role that support for appropriate development could play in the process of defeating apartheid.
This paper demonstrates that the anti-apartheid movement could
have corrected this failure, without any real sacrifice in the financial
pressure imposed on the SAG, by incorporating into the sanctions an
189. In this sense, the failure of the anti-apartheid's financial sanctions campaign bears some
resemblance to those IMF structural adjustment policies that have been criticized for an overemphasis on macroeconomic factors at the expense of the distributional and social aspects of
economic development. See sources cited supra note 1.
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appropriate development exception. This development exception
could have been structured to only generate financial support for development and commercial activities that are consistent with the principles of sustainable, efficient development, and with international
human rights standards.
Two interesting conclusions can be derived from this analysis of
the South African case. The first is that the proposed developmentoriented financial sanctions technique can be used against any country
that violates any of its citizens' human rights and in which foreign
enterprises, particularly banks and other creditors, have blocked assets. The use of this technique will ensure that sanctions can both help
modify the behavior of the offending government and strengthen the
ability of its victims to promote their own human rights and developmental interests.
The second lesson is that the key elements of the proposed appropriate development criteria are not necessarily dependent on the peculiar characteristics of South Africa or of a human rights-related
sanctions campaign. These criteria can also be used by development
and human-rights NGOs to test the developmental appropriateness of
any proposed development project and to promote dialogue on the
linkages between human rights and sustainable development. It would
indeed be a fitting tribute to the participants in the anti-apartheid
struggle if its successes and failures could be used by those concerned
with human rights and development to devise more effective ways of
promoting human rights and sustainable development.

